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The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress

Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada: The
CJPTA—A Decade of Progress
JANET WALKER*
In 2016, the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (“CJPTA”) marked its tenth year
in force. Promulgated by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, and adopted in British
Columbia, Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the CJPTA was developed to clarify and advance
the law of judicial jurisdiction. In a symposium hosted by Osgoode Hall Law School, ten
leading scholars were invited to present papers on specific questions in order to assess the
promise of the CJPTA to meet the needs of Canadians in the years ahead and to provide
leadership for the law in other parts of Canada. This article provides an overview of the
issues discussed in the symposium; it places the papers that were presented in the larger
context of developments in the law of judicial jurisdiction in Canada and internationally; and
it summarizes in an appendix the drafting reforms that might be made to the Act.
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I. THE COMMON LAW AND THE CJPTA
IN 2016, THE COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS TRANSFER ACT

(“CJPTA”) marked its tenth year in force. Promulgated by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada (“ULCC”),1 and adopted in Saskatchewan, British
Columbia, and Nova Scotia,2 the CJPTA was developed to clarify and advance
the law of judicial jurisdiction. In a symposium hosted by Osgoode Hall Law
School,3 ten leading scholars were invited to present papers on specific questions
1.

2.

3.

Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting,
Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/images/
stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.pdf>
at 140 [CJPTA].
The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1 [CJPTA (SK)]; Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28 [CJPTA (BC)]; Court Jurisdiction
and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003, c 2 (2nd Sess) [CJPTA (NS)]. The CJPTA came into
force in 2004, 2006, and 2008 respectively in these provinces.
And supported by generous funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada and Lerners LLP.
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in order to assess the promise of the CJPTA to meet the needs of Canadians in
the years ahead and to provide leadership for the law in other parts of Canada.4
A number of these papers have been published as articles in this Special Issue of
the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
This article provides an overview of the issues discussed in the symposium,
and it places the papers that were presented in the larger context of developments
in the law of judicial jurisdiction in Canada and internationally. Part I of this
article summarizes the developments leading up to the symposium; it comments
on the consideration of the differences today between the common law and the
CJPTA contained in the first symposium paper,5 and it notes the results of an
empirical study of the impact of the state of the law of jurisdiction on access
to justice.6 Parts II–IV of this article then comment on the issues that were
considered in the remaining papers, and Part V offers some further thoughts on
the decade ahead.
The sequence of the issues considered in the papers discussed in Parts II–VI
of this article follow the structure of the CJPTA. The main bases of jurisdiction
(consent and general jurisdiction), which are provided for in section 3 of the
CJPTA, were addressed in the second, third and fourth papers of the symposium,7
with special attention being given in the third paper to questions of access to local
courts for consumers and other vulnerable groups.8 These issues are considered
in Part II of this article.
The courts’ discretion to accept jurisdiction in exceptional situations,
which is found in section 6 of the CJPTA, was addressed in the fifth paper of

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

Many of these papers are contained in this Special Issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal.
Stephen Pitel, “Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other? Jurisdiction in Common Law
Canada” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 63.
Gerard J Kennedy, “Jurisdiction Motions and Access to Justice: An Ontario Tale” (2018)
55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 79.
Geneviève Saumier, “Has the CJPTA readied Canada to adopt The Hague Choice of Court
Convention?” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 141; John McEvoy, “Conflict of Laws and
Consumer Contracts in Canada” (Paper delivered at the CJPTA: A Decade of Progress,
University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished]; Catherine Walsh, “General
Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants under the CJPTA: Consistent with International
Standards?” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 163. In comparing the CJPTA to the common
law, Pitel incidentally considers issues (including the “real and substantial connection”)
relating to the grounds for service outside the jurisdiction. See Pitel, supra note 5.
McEvoy, supra note 7.
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the symposium and in an additional paper prepared for this Special Issue;9 and
the courts’ discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction, which is provided for
in section 11 of the CJPTA, was addressed in the sixth paper.10 These issues are
considered in Part III of this article.
The mechanisms for transferring proceedings, which are provided for in Part
3 of the CJPTA, were considered in the seventh paper;11 and questions of the
scope of the CJPTA, which are highlighted by jurisdiction over family law matters
were considered in the eighth paper.12 The implications of the CJPTA for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments within Canada and elsewhere were
considered in the ninth paper; and the implications of the CJPTA for Canada’s
participation in international regimes for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments were considered in the tenth paper.13 These issues are considered in
Part IV of this article.
As mentioned above, this article concludes with some observations about
the future of the CJPTA. At the end of the article, there is an appendix that
contains suggestions for drafting amendments that reflect the observations made
on possible reforms to the CJPTA throughout this article.
A. TWO HISTORIES: MORGUARD AND THE CJPTA

Although the CJPTA has been in force for only a decade, its history dates back to
its development in 1993 by the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. The path of
its development has crisscrossed that of the common law since that time. Tracing

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Michael Sobkin, “Residual Discretion: The Concept of Forum of Necessity Under the
Uniform Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 203;
Sagi Peari, “Three Objections to Forum of Necessity: Global Access to Justice, International
Criminal Law, and Proper Party” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 225.
Elizabeth Edinger, “Discretion and the CJPTA” (Paper delivered at The CJPTA: A Decade of
Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished] at 7.
Vaughan Black, “Cross-Border Transfers of Court Proceedings” (2018) 55:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 239.
Martha Bailey, “Judicial Jurisdiction Rules for Family Law Matters” (Paper delivered at The
CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016) [unpublished].
Angela Swan, “The Other End of the Process: Enforcement of Judgments” (Paper delivered
at The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club of Toronto, 21 October 2016)
[unpublished]; Joost Blom, “How might the CJPTA function in light of the current Hague
Conference multilateral judgments convention project and, ultimately, one harmonizing
judicial jurisdiction?” (Paper delivered at The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, University Club
of Toronto, 21 October 2016), “The Court Jurisdiction Proceedings Transfer Act and the Hague
Conference’s Judgments and Jurisdiction Projects” (2018) 55:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 257.
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the paths of the common law and the CJPTA provides an important context for
the issues considered in the symposium.
A quarter of a century ago, following the introduction of new rules for the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in Canada, it was suggested that the
new rules could have implications for the law of jurisdiction.14 The Supreme Court
of Canada had held in Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye15 that a Canadian
court should recognize a judgment from another Canadian court where that
court had exercised “properly restrained jurisdiction” because the standards for
jurisdiction (exercised by the court issuing the judgment and the court enforcing
it) should correlate with one another.16 It follows from this that the standards
for appropriately exercised jurisdiction would also need to be reviewed to ensure
that they would be suitable bases on which the resulting judgments could fairly
be accorded “full faith and credit,” to use the term made familiar by US law and
jurisprudence.
To achieve this, the ULCC initiated a project to codify the law of jurisdiction
“to replace the widely different jurisdictional rules currently used in Canadian
courts with a uniform set of standards for determining jurisdiction.”17 The
project resulted in the development of the CJPTA, a uniform Act that the ULCC
adopted in 1994.18 Also during this period, a new book—Book X—was added
to the Civil Code of Québec (“CCQ”) to provide codified principles for Quebec
courts in cross-border matters. Title 3 of Book X, which contains the rules on
jurisdiction, also came into force in 1994.19
The new rules introduced by the Supreme Court of Canada did not present
significant “correlation” concerns for the traditional grounds of jurisdiction—
those over local defendants and over defendants who consented to the court’s

14. Vaughan Black, “The Other Side of Morguard: New Limits on Judicial Jurisdiction” (1993)
22:1 Can Bus LJ 4.
15. [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 76 DLR (4th) 256 [Morguard].
16. Ibid at para 42.
17. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting
(Charlottetown, 1994) at 48, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/
current-uniform-acts/739-jurisdiction/civil-jurisdiction/1730-court-jurisdiction-proceedingstransfer-act>.
18. See Vaughan Black, Stephen GA Pitel & Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of
the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012).
19. Book Ten CCQ [CCQ].
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jurisdiction.20 It was already well accepted that a judgment would be enforced
where it was issued by a court against a defendant who was a local person in
that forum or who had consented to the court’s jurisdiction. To be fair, the
designations of when a defendant was to be regarded as a local defendant and
when a defendant was to be regarded as consenting raised interpretive questions,
but in principle these grounds were and continue to be recognized widely in
other common law countries for the purposes of enforcement.
However, the new rules did raise the question of binding defendants from
outside the forum who did not consent or defend. The courts were now expected
to recognize the judgments of courts that had exercised properly restrained
jurisdiction in these circumstances. This was said to occur when there was a
“real and substantial connection” between the matter and the forum, which it
was said would meet the constitutional requirements of the principles of order
and fairness. If this was to be a correlative of the jurisdiction that the courts
themselves exercised, it raised the question of what would qualify as a real and
substantial connection such that it would constitute the exercise of jurisdiction
appropriately so as to meet the constitutional requirement.21
Until then, common law courts in Canada had exercised jurisdiction
on the basis of lists of grounds for serving defendants outside the forum that
were found in rules of civil procedure. The lists had long histories that were
not well documented. The lists were similar to one another but not entirely
uniform among the common law provinces or between common law provinces
in Canada and other common law countries; nor were the lists based on any
readily recognized underlying premise. Indeed, while many of the listed grounds
seemed to relate to events giving rise to the claim that had occurred in the forum,
some of them clearly did not.22 As was later explained, these lists were developed
as rules for service out, not as a means of exhaustively defining the scope of

20. These rules, however, are subject to issues arising from the archaic common law view that
general jurisdiction over individuals was based on physical presence. See Pitel, supra note 5
at 69. For a discussion regarding issues about general jurisdiction over corporations, see
Walsh, supra note 7 at 167.
21. Ibid.
22. See e.g. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 17.02(h) [RCP]. Rule 17.02(h) was
revoked by O Reg 231/13, s 5. See also ibid, r 17.02(o). Rule 17.02(o) was revoked by O
Reg 43/14, s 6.
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jurisdiction.23 Still, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that “they
represent an expression of wisdom and experience drawn from the life of the
law”24 and, on this view, should be considered carefully in any reform.
The drafters of the CJPTA sought to articulate an underlying principle that
was consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s pronouncement and to
rationalize the list of grounds for service out. According to the CJPTA, a court is
permitted to exercise jurisdiction in general where “there is a real and substantial
connection between [the forum] … and the facts on which the proceeding
against that person is based.”25 Having offered a definition of real and substantial
connection, the drafters of the CJPTA also reviewed the grounds that typically
appeared in the rules for service outside the province to determine which of them
fit this definition. The grounds that did not fit, such as “damages sustained in the
province”26 and “necessary or proper parties,”27 were omitted from the list to be
included in the CJPTA.
B. THE MUSCUTT TEST: “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION”
DEFINED?

As the years passed, no clarity emerged in the common law on what constituted
a real and substantial connection despite the jurisprudence and academic
commentary. To be fair, the disparities between the rules for service out and
those that would meet the constitutional requirements of order and fairness
affected only a small number of cases, and so the concerns took some time to
develop. However, the issue came to a head in a case in which a plaintiff asked
the courts of Ontario to exercise jurisdiction over a personal injury claim in
respect of a traffic accident that had occurred in Alberta. The plaintiff who had
moved from Ontario to Alberta before the accident, sought to rely upon the
“damages sustained in the province” (i.e., Ontario) on the premise that he had
23. See Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd, 2010 ONCA 84 at para 72, 98 OR (3d) 721 [Van Breda
(CA)]. It is explained that:
In Muscutt, at para. 51, we adopted a statement from Janet Walker in G.D. Watson & L. Jeffrey,
eds., Holmested and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure (Carswell: Toronto, 2001), at p. 17-19,
that the grounds outlined in rule 17.02 “provide a rough guide to the kinds of cases in which
persons outside Ontario will be regarded as subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts.”

24. Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 at para 88, [2012] 1 SCR 572, LeBel J
[Van Breda (SCC)].
25. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(e).
26. See discussion of former Rule 17.02(h) in supra note 22.
27. See discussion of former Rule 17.02(o) in supra note 22.
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resumed his residence in Ontario following the accident and continued to suffer
damages while in Ontario. The defendant argued that even if Canadian courts
had historically exercised jurisdiction on this basis, this was not the kind of real
and substantial connection contemplated by the constitutional requirements of
the principles of order and fairness, and the court was constitutionally incapable
of exercising jurisdiction.28
To consider this, the Court of Appeal for Ontario convened a panel of five
judges in 2002 to hear this appeal and four other appeals in companion cases
raising similar issues in various circumstances.29 The Court of Appeal held that
the rules for service ex juris were merely a rough guide to the constitutionally
permissible bases for jurisdiction. The court formulated an eight-factor test for
determining whether there was a real and substantial connection, which came to
be known as the “Muscutt test.”30
The test included factual and evaluative factors that were all to be assessed,
but in a flexible and non-hierarchical way. In particular, after assessing the
connections between the claim and the forum and the defendant and the forum,
courts were asked to consider the unfairness to the defendant in assuming
jurisdiction and the unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction.
Commentators expressed concerns about the indeterminacy of the Muscutt test
and the way in which its case-specific flexibility31 and consideration of fairness
to each of the parties conflated the test for forum non conveniens with the test for

28. Muscutt v Courcelles (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20, 213 DLR (4th) 577 (CA)
[Muscutt cited to OR].
29. Ibid; Leufkens v Alba Tours International Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 84, 213 DLR (4th) 614
(CA); Lemmex v Sunflight Holidays Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 54, 213 DLR (4th) 627 (CA);
Sinclair v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 76, 213 DLR (4th) 643
(CA); Gajraj v DeBernardo (2002), 60 OR (3d) 68, 213 DLR (4th) 651 (CA). See also Janet
Walker, “Beyond Real and Substantial Connection: The Muscutt Quintet” in Todd Archibald
& Michael Cochrane, eds, Annual Review on Civil Litigation (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) 61
[Walker, “Muscutt Quintet”].
30. The eight factors were: (1) the connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim;
(2) the connection between the forum and the defendant; (3) unfairness to the defendant
in assuming jurisdiction; (4) unfairness to the plaintiff in not assuming jurisdiction; (5)
the involvement of other parties to the suit; (6) the court’s willingness to recognize and
enforce an extra-provincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis; (7) whether
the case is interprovincial or international in nature; and (8) comity and the standards of
jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement prevailing elsewhere. See Muscutt, supra note 28
at paras 76-107.
31. See text accompanying note 37 below.
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jurisdiction simpliciter.32 In time, in a move that might be described as “voting
with their feet,” some provinces chose to eliminate the confusion associated with
the common law standards by adopting the CJPTA.33
Having come together briefly in the first part of the 1990s, and then again
in the early 2000s, the common law and the CJPTA largely, but not entirely,
parted ways once again. On the one hand, there continued to be debate in the
jurisprudence about the extent to which the common law should be regarded as
a source of interpretation for the CJPTA provisions.34 On the other hand, the
common law continued to struggle on in its own search for clarity.
C. MUSCUTT GIVES WAY TO VAN BREDA

In spring of 2009, the Law Commission of Ontario released a Consultation
Paper35 seeking input on possible reform to the law of judicial jurisdiction.
In particular, the Consultation Paper asked stakeholders for their views on the
potential benefits of codifying the law of judicial jurisdiction in view of perceived
uncertainty in the law, the implications for increased expense to parties in the
preliminary stages of litigation, and the barriers this might create to access to
justice. It further asked stakeholders for their views on the value of consistency in
the law of jurisdiction among the superior courts of the provinces and territories
and on the merits of adopting a statute based on the CJPTA which, at that time,
had been implemented by British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia.
Responses were received by a number of organizations and individuals,
including: The Advocates’ Society; The Toronto Opinion Group; members of
the profession, such as Alejandro Manevich of Heenan Blaikie LLP; scholars
such as Professors Vaughan Black and Stephen Pitel, and specialists in private
32. Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29; Coutu v Gauthier (Succession de), 2006 NBCA 16,
296 NBR (2d) 34 [Coutu]; Fewer v Sayisi Dene Education Authority, 2011 NLCA 17, 305
Nfld & PEIR 39 [Fewer].
33. In Saskatchewan, the CJPTA entered into force in 2004. See CJPTA (SK), supra note 2.
In British Columbia, the CJPTA entered into force in 2006. See CJPTA (BC), supra note
2. In Nova Scotia, the CJPTA entered into force in 2008. See CJPTA (NS), supra note 2.
In Prince Edward Island, the CJPTA has not yet entered into force. See Court Jurisdiction and
Proceedings Transfer Act, SPEI 1997, c 61. In the Yukon, the CJPTA has been enacted but has
not yet entered into force. See Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SY 2000, c 7.
34. Pitel cites two cases as examples of this divergence of view: Bouch v Penny (Litigation
Guardian of ), 2009 NSCA 80, 281 NSR (2d) 238 [Bouch]; Stanway v Wyeth Pharmaceuticals
Inc, 2009 BCCA 592 at para 73, 314 DLR (4th) 618. See Pitel, supra note 5 at 66.
35. Janet Walker, “Consultation Paper: Reforming the Law of Crossborder Litigation - Judicial
Jurisdiction” (Paper delivered to the Law Commission of Ontario, March 2009), online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=1491169>.
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international law from other countries including Professor Richard Garnett
(Australia) and Professor Catherine Kessedjian (France). Responders directed
their comments to a range of issues canvassed in the consultation, but many
agreed that there was uncertainty in the law and there were potential benefits
of codification.
The responses were not limited to those coming from the organizations and
individuals answering the questions posed. In its own response of sorts, the Court
of Appeal for Ontario took the unusual step of inviting counsel in two appeals
that had been heard and were on reserve, those in Van Breda v Village Resorts Ltd
and Charron v Bel Air Travel Group Ltd36 to address the possibility of changes to
the Muscutt framework of analysis. The developments in the law that the court
cited as prompting the review included jurisprudence and academic commentary,
the implementation of the CJPTA, and the Consultation on Judicial Jurisdiction
conducted in association with the Law Commission of Ontario.37 The courts had
taken up the baton in advancing the law.
In the autumn of 2009, the Court of Appeal for Ontario convened a panel of
five judges for the supplementary hearing of the Van Breda and Charron appeals.
The court heard submissions from counsel and from intervenors38 for the purpose
of deciding whether the Muscutt test should “be retained, modified, simplified
or abandoned in favour of a different approach.”39 In the spring of 2010, the
court released its judgment clarifying and simplifying somewhat the Muscutt
36. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 1.
37. The court cited Coutu, supra note 32; Black v Breeden (2009), 309 DLR (4th) 708, 73 CPC
(6th) 83 (Ont Sup Ct); Vaughan Black & Mat Brechtel, “Muscutt v. Courcelles Revisited:
The Court of Appeal for Ontario Takes Another Look” (2009) 36:1 Adv Q 35; Vaughan
Black & Stephen GA Pitel, “Reform of Ontario’s Law on Jurisdiction” (2009) 47:3 Can Bus
LJ 469; Janet Walker, “Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum of Necessity Jurisdiction in
Canada” (2009) 48:1 Can Bus LJ 135 [Walker, “Forum of Necessity”]; Jean-Gabriel Castel,
“The Uncertainty Factor in Canadian Private International Law” (2007) 52:3 McGill LJ
555; Tanya J Monestier, “A ‘Real and Substantial’ Mess: The Law of Jurisdiction in Canada”
(2007) 33:1 Queen’s LJ 179; Stephen GA Pitel & Cheryl D Dusten, “Lost in Transition:
Answering the Questions Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada’s New Approach to
Jurisdiction” (2006) 85:1 Can Bar Rev 61; Joost Blom & Elizabeth Edinger, “The Chimera
of the Real and Substantial Connection Test” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 373; Cheryl D
Dusten & Stephen GA Pitel, “The Right Answers to Ontario’s Jurisdictional Questions:
Dismiss, Stay or Set Service Aside” (2005) 30:3 Adv Q 297; Elizabeth Edinger, “Spar
Aerospace: A Reconciliation of Morguard with the Traditional Framework for Determining
Jurisdiction” (2003) 61:4 Advocate 511; Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29.
38. The intervenors that presented submissions were the Tourism Industry Association of
Ontario and the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association.
39. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 50.
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test. In addition, the court acknowledged, without relying upon, a new provision
found in the CJPTA for extending the courts’ jurisdictional reach beyond cases
in which there was a real and substantial connection to those in which the court
regarded it appropriate to serve as a “forum of necessity.”40
Whether the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s test would become the new
common law standard continued to be an open question for the next two years
while the decision was under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the first
year while the matter was being prepared for the hearing, and the second year
while the decision remained on reserve. Then, in the spring of 2012, the Supreme
Court of Canada issued its judgment41 announcing its own test. It was one that was
ostensibly limited in scope to matters in tort; that relied upon four “presumptive
connecting factors”; and that was analytically unrelated to any test that had come
before, either in Canada or elsewhere. The jurisprudential development, which
had preempted any legislative reform initiatives, such as those that might have
followed the Law Commission of Ontario consultation, would now come to be
assessed for its promise to clarify the law as was previously done by the CJPTA.
The assessment has not been favourable. One concern that has arisen relates
to the scope of the application of the ruling. The Court of Appeal for Ontario had
noted that the Muscutt test that it had developed particularly for the “damages
sustained in” cases had been applied to all cases of service ex juris;42 and now,
despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s clear statement that the Van Breda test
was intended for cases in tort,43 it too has been applied as a general standard
for service ex juris cases across a broad range of cases. Whether the test might
have been suitable for the limited context for which it was developed is unclear.
However, a more general test—or a principle on which tests for specific kinds of
40. Ibid at para 100. Justice Sharpe states: “In my view, the overriding concern for access to
justice that motivates the assumption of jurisdiction despite inadequate connection with the
forum should be accommodated by explicit recognition of the forum of necessity exception
rather than by distorting the real and substantial connection test.” See also Walker, “Forum
of Necessity,” supra note 37.
41. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24.
42. Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 51.
43. See Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 at para 40, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron].
The Court explained the intended scope of the Van Breda test as follows:
LeBel J. further—and repeatedly—confined the principles he developed in Van Breda to the
assumption of jurisdiction in tort actions. ... “The list of presumptive connecting factors
proposed here relates to claims in tort and issues associated with such claims. It does not
purport to be an inventory of connecting factors covering the conditions for the assumption
of jurisdiction over all claims known to the law” (ibid, citing Van Breda (SCC), supra note
24 at para 85).
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cases—was needed, if not a comprehensive framework. Another concern is that
Canada now has different jurisdictional standards applied in courts in Quebec,
in the common law provinces that have adopted the CJPTA, and in the common
law provinces operating under the Van Breda doctrine. The patchwork of regimes
that prompted the initiative to simplify the law by introducing the CJPTA has
become even more complex.
D. THE COMMON LAW WANDERS AND THE CJPTA CELEBRATES TEN
YEARS

In light of the continuing history of inconclusive developments in the common
law it was timely, on the tenth anniversary of the operation of the CJPTA,
to convene a symposium to review the CJPTA and its promise to meet the
challenges experienced in the common law provinces that have not adopted it.
It was also timely to consider whether international trends in the law make it
desirable to update some of the features of the CJPTA.
The symposium was held in the autumn of 2016 at Osgoode Hall Law
School.44 Leading scholars in the field were invited to present papers on ten
questions relating to various aspects of the law of judicial jurisdiction as follows:
1. Professor Stephen Pitel: “How different today is the law in the
CJPTA provinces from that in the common law provinces in Canada?”
2. Professor Geneviève Saumier: “Has the CJPTA readied Canada to
adopt the Hague Choice of Court Convention?”
3. Professor John McEvoy: “Is there a need for special provisions for
consumers, workers and other vulnerable groups, such as exists in
Québec and the European Union?”
4. Professor Catherine Walsh: “Are the standards for ordinary
residence for businesses consistent with the current national and
international standards?”
5. Michael Sobkin: “Is there a need for residual jurisdiction to
promote access to justice for plaintiffs who cannot sue elsewhere
and to enable other parties to be joined as necessary? What is the
appropriate standard?”
6. Professor Elizabeth Edinger: “Is there a continuing need for
discretion to decline jurisdiction? Do we have the right formula
for exercising discretion, and are we considering the right factors?”
44. The symposium, The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress, was organized and moderated by Professor
Janet Walker, with vital assistance in funding applications and logistics provided by Dr. Sagi
Peari and Gerard Kennedy.
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7. Professor Vaughan Black: “Is the transfer of proceedings
mechanism working well?”
8. Professor Martha Bailey: “Should there be a consolidated set of
rules for family law matters, such as exists in Québec for family law
matters? What kinds of proceedings would it include?”
9. Professor Angela Swan: “Will the judgments of courts exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to the CJPTA be enforceable in other provinces
and countries (and are either compatible with Morguard Investments
Ltd v De Savoye)?”
10. Professor Joost Blom: “How might the CJPTA function in light of
the current Hague Conference multilateral judgments convention
project and, ultimately, one harmonizing judicial jurisdiction?”
E.

HOW DIFFERENT TODAY IS THE COMMON LAW FROM THE CJPTA?

A basic question that arises from the two histories of jurisdictional law in common
law Canada is the extent to which the two regimes differ in practice. In his
article, addressing the question “How different today is the law in the CJPTA
provinces from that in the common law provinces in Canada?” Professor Pitel
identified two main differences, the first of which was that the CJPTA is clear in
its adoption of “ordinary residence” for general jurisdiction over natural persons
and in setting out detailed provisions for the ordinary residence of legal persons,
where the common law standard historically has been one of physical presence.
In response, it might be asked whether, in fact, the common law continues
to espouse physical presence as a standard for jurisdiction over individuals. This
is unlikely to be examined directly, because it would require a case in which
jurisdiction had been exercised over a defendant on the basis of presence alone—
in such a case, a court would be likely to decline jurisdiction in any event on
the basis of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, guidance in the jurisprudence
on this question is likely in future judgments to continue to be limited to
comments in obiter.45 Furthermore, it is generally possible to serve a defendant
locally at the defendant’s address even when the defendant is abroad.46 Therefore,
it might be said that general jurisdiction over individuals in the common law
45. In Chevron, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the use of service in cases of the
enforcement of foreign judgments, but this was explained in part as a consequence of the
fact that the court was not exercising adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Chevron, supra note 43
at paras 44-48.
46. See e.g. RCP, supra note 22, r 16.03(5).
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provinces that have not adopted the CJPTA is, for all practical purposes, based
on the residence of the defendant and not, as the traditional treatises suggest,
the defendant’s presence. Nevertheless, as Professor Pitel observed, the CJPTA is
different from the common law in that it is explicit in providing standards for
general jurisdiction for natural persons and for legal persons that are based on
ordinary residence.
Second, Professor Pitel noted a number of differences between the CJPTA
and the common law in the connecting factors for service ex juris cases. He first
considered the continuing uncertainty over whether the grounds listed in the
CJPTA are exhaustive, or whether they permit service on analogous grounds.47
This may not reflect a difference from the common law,48 but the way in which
the scope of jurisdiction is defined could benefit from greater clarity in any event.
Then, turning to specific grounds, Professor Pitel noted that the intended
performance of a contract in the forum, and consumer transactions that had
been solicited in the forum were included in the CJPTA but did not exist in the
rules for service outside the province. Again, whether these represent significant
practical differences between the jurisdictional standards may be debated in that
functional equivalents of the CJPTA grounds may be found, for example, in the
breach of contract in the forum ground listed in the rules for service outside
Ontario,49 and the jurisdictional provisions in consumer protection legislation.50
In addition, Professor Pitel noted the re-introduction in Van Breda of the
long abandoned “contract made in the jurisdiction” by the Supreme Court of
Canada that was not included in the CJPTA. On subsequent review by the
Supreme Court of Canada, this factor has since been questioned,51 and closer
inspection of the intended application of this ground suggests that it was a variant
on the “related claims and parties” connection that was omitted, first from the
CJPTA and then from the common law.52 Finally, Professor Pitel observed that
the restriction on jurisdiction to pronounce on title to foreign immovables exists
in the common law but was not adopted in the CJPTA.53
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Pitel, supra note 5 at 64.
As discussed further in Part II.
RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(f )(iv), Schedule A, s 100.
Consumer Protection Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 30, Schedule A [CPA, 2002].
See Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016
SCC 30 at para 88, [2016] 1 SCR 851. Justice Côté (in the dissent) states, “I am aware
of no conflicts regime that accepts that a forum has subject matter jurisdiction over a
claim in tort simply because a contract “connected with” that claim was formed there”
[emphasis in original].
52. See notes 113-114 and accompanying text below.
53. Pitel, supra note 5 at 76. See also the examples noted in supra note 34.
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A simple listing of the differences in service ex juris jurisdiction in this way
might make the concerns that these differences raise sound marginal or incidental;
but differences, however small, can reflect significant barriers to access to the
courts for those whose cases are affected. Moreover, as Professor Pitel noted, even
if the differences affect only a minority of cases, a statutory regime would make
the law “more available and more knowable” to the general public and that would
be of considerable benefit.54 In this regard, after the symposium was held, a further
study was conducted by Gerard Kennedy to examine empirically the costs of this
uncertainty by assessing trends in jurisdictional motions and examining the costs
awarded in them. That study is published in this Special Issue.55
Finally, in addition to the immediate benefits of greater clarity outlined by
Professor Pitel, any desired reform to the law would benefit from a clear and
common starting point that enables the law to be considered as a whole and not
in piecemeal fashion as occurs in the case law.

II. CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION AND GENERAL
JURISDICTION
The first substantive provision of the CJPTA, section 3, sets out an exhaustive
list of five bases on which a court may exercise territorial competence over in
personam proceedings. The first three of these bases relate to the consent of the
parties to the court’s jurisdiction.
A. ATTORNMENT

Although not addressed directly in any of the symposium papers, for the
sake of a complete analysis, it is worth noting the first two of the bases of
jurisdiction relying on the parties’ consent, which may be described as forms of
“appearance,” “submission,” or “attornment.”56 They are set out in section 3 of
the CJPTA as follows:
(a) that person is the plaintiff in another proceeding in the court to which the
proceeding in question is a counterclaim,
(b) during the course of the proceeding that person submits to the court’s
jurisdiction.57

54.
55.
56.
57.

Ibid.
Kennedy, supra note 6.
Janet Walker, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 6th ed (Markham, Lexis Nexis: 2005) at 11.2.
CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(a), (b).
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These two bases of jurisdiction are widely accepted and generally consistent
with the common law in Canada and with the CCQ. Although there have
been interpretive questions about the operation of the bases,58 the debates
have not undermined the underlying certainty of the base as codified in the
CJPTA. Nevertheless, the addition of the phrase “by defending the merits of
the proceeding” could provide guidance on the means by which these bases
commonly indicated.59
B. JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS AND NEGATIVE JURISDICTION
PROVISIONS

The third basis of jurisdiction provided in section 3 of the CJPTA reads as follows:
(c) there is an agreement between the plaintiff and that person to the effect that the
court has jurisdiction in the proceeding.60

Like the first two provisions, this provision is in principle clear and
uncontroversial. However, it requires further detail to meet the current needs of
cross-border litigation in commercial matters. This is considered in the article

58. In the first form of attornment or submission listed in the CJPTA—by commencing a
proceeding in the court—the plaintiff, who is also the defendant by counterclaim, has
waived any right to object to that court’s jurisdiction. See ibid, s 3(a). Questions that can
arise include:
1. Does the subject matter of the counterclaim need to be related to the main claim so
as to operate to waive the right of the counterclaim’s defendant to object to the court’s
jurisdiction?; and
2. Does such a waiver apply to all plaintiffs, including those such as foreign states who
would otherwise be immune from the court’s jurisdiction?
In the second form of attornment, the defendant has waived any basis that it might have
to object by appearing in the proceeding to defend against the merits. See ibid, s 3(b).
Many of the questions that have arisen in particular cases about this have related to the
accepted view that the defendant should be permitted to appear in the proceedings for the
purpose of challenging the court’s jurisdiction without being regarded as having attorned.
To enable defendants to challenge jurisdiction without being regarded as having attorned,
courts in many common law countries have arranged their processes to permit jurisdictional
challenges to be heard before a statement of defence is submitted. Nevertheless, debate in
the jurisprudence over the demarcation between jurisdictional challenges and defenses on
the merits has arisen in enforcement actions. This is particularly true where there is overlap
between these two phases in the procedure in the forum of the rendering court, and where
there is an obligation to take steps, for example, by mandatory case management deadlines.
59. See Appendix: Court Jurisdiction Act—Suggested Drafting Amendments, below, s3(1)
(b) [Appendix].
60. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(c).
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prepared by Geneviève Saumier on the question: “Has the CJPTA readied Canada
to adopt The Hague Choice of Court Convention?”61
The Hague Choice of Court Convention seeks to ensure the effectiveness of
choice of court agreements between businesses in international commercial
agreements. It came into force in 2015 and it includes among its signatories the
United States, Mexico, and the European Union.62 The ULCC adopted a model
implementation statute in 2010,63 which has since been adopted in Ontario,
subject to ratification by Canada, and may be adopted in other provinces.
As Professor Saumier explains in her article, the current provision of the CJPTA,
which codifies the common law, fails to address two critical features of the Choice
of Court Convention.
The first of these deficiencies is that the CJPTA contains no negative
jurisdiction provision. While the CJPTA establishes that the court may exercise
jurisdiction where there is an agreement between the parties nominating the
courts of the forum, it does not include the corollary provision that the court
may not exercise jurisdiction where the parties have agreed that some other court
has exclusive exercise jurisdiction. In many situations, the benefits in planning
for dispute resolution of achieving certainty of access to suitable fora apply
equally to achieving certainty of protection from unsuitable fora. Despite recent
jurisprudence recognizing these benefits,64 the historic resistance of common law
courts to the idea that the parties might exclude their jurisdiction by agreement
has prevented the common law from embracing a clear position on this.65
In contrast, the CCQ contains a clear provision for negative jurisdiction.
Article 3148, which states that “[i]n personal actions of a patrimonial nature,
Québec authorities have jurisdiction [in specified situations],” finishes with the
following paragraph:
However, Québec authorities have no jurisdiction where the parties have chosen
by agreement to submit the present or future disputes between themselves relating

61. Saumier, supra note 7.
62. Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, Hague
Conference on Private International Law (entered into force 1 October 2015), online: <www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=98> [Choice of Court Convention].
63. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements Act (2010), Uniform Law Conference of
Canada, online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-new-order/current-uniform-acts/645-hagueconvention-choice-of-court/1404-hague-convention-on-choice-of-court-agreements-act>.
64. Expedition Helicopters Inc v Honeywell Inc, 2010 ONCA 351 at para 11, 100 OR (3d) 241.
65. Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board Ship or Vessel Eleftheria v The Eleftheria (1969), [1970]
P 94 at 99-100, [1969] 2 WLR 1073; ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27 at
para 21, [2003] 1 SCR 450.
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to a specific legal relationship to a foreign authority or to an arbitrator, unless the
defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the Québec authority.66

As Professor Saumier concluded in her paper, the adoption of the Choice of
Court Convention would require the replacement of the ad hoc judicial discretion
that currently characterizes the common law with a clear obligation to decline
jurisdiction where the parties, by agreement, have chosen to submit their disputes
to another court.
Whether or not the eventual adoption of the Choice of Court Convention
across the common law provinces in Canada necessitates a change in the law,
the fact that Canada’s major trading partners—the United States, the European
Union, and Mexico—are signatories is good reason to bring the law in Canada
into line with this emerging international standard. In the CJPTA, a negative
jurisdiction provision modelled on the provision contained in the Civil Code of
Québec, could be added following the positive jurisdiction provisions currently
found in section 3 of the CJPTA.67
C. VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE AND NON-EXCLUSIVE
AGREEMENTS

The obligation to respect exclusive jurisdiction agreements favouring other fora
may be the most significant point in issue, but four further points affecting
jurisdiction agreements are worth considering in assessing the CJPTA.
First, one reason why common law courts have been reluctant to recognize
the ousting of their jurisdiction by the parties’ agreement is the need to
ensure that their jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the jurisdiction
agreement is valid. This concern is addressed in the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration for cases in which the parties have entered
into an arbitration agreement by providing that the court shall refer the parties
to arbitration “unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.”68 A clarification of this point could be achieved
by adding the word “valid” to the text of the CJPTA.69

66. CCQ, supra note 19, art 3148.
67. See Appendix, below, s 3(2).
68. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with Amendments as Adopted in 2008, (Vienna:
United Nations, 2006), art 8(1).
69. See Appendix, below, s 3(2).
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Second, the Choice of Court Convention makes mandatory the exercise
of jurisdiction by the court nominated in the jurisdiction agreement.70
Jurisdiction-mandating provisions can interfere with the common law courts’
ability to prevent abuse. In one Federal Court of Appeal decision, the court
considered a mandatory jurisdiction provision of a federal statute71 that appeared
to override a jurisdiction agreement. The court held that the statute could mandate
the existence of jurisdiction, but it could not oust the court’s inherent authority72
to control its own process and exercise discretion to decline to hear the case.73
However, since the jurisdiction mandating provision in the CJPTA supports
rather than overrides party autonomy it would seem rare for a situation to arise
in which a Canadian court would nevertheless wish to decline jurisdiction.
Third, the Choice of Court Convention applies only to exclusive jurisdiction
agreements,74 and does not provide for non-exclusive or “permissive” jurisdiction
agreements. It might be just as important to support the parties’ choice to
nominate a court while maintaining the flexibility to submit a dispute to another
forum as it is to support their choice to submit their agreements exclusively to
one court. Accommodating this would affect neither the jurisdiction-removing
nor the jurisdiction-mandating provisions. However, a permissive jurisdiction
agreement could be added to the factors currently found in the CJPTA for
determining whether a court should decline jurisdiction if asked to do so.75
Should the CJPTA provide for the exercise of discretion in cases involving
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it would be helpful for the statute to
indicate that the exercise of discretion, either to accept jurisdiction or to decline
jurisdiction, should be guided by a presumption in favour of the forum selected
by the parties. A provision to this effect is including in the Suggested Drafting
Amendments in the Appendix of this article.
D. PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS, WORKERS, AND OTHER
VULNERABLE PARTIES

A fourth issue affecting jurisdiction agreements in the CJPTA concerns contracts
with consumers, workers, and insured persons. Just as it is important to support
party autonomy in interpreting jurisdiction agreements, so too is it important
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 5(2).
Marine Liability Act, SC 2001, c 6, s 46.
See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C-43, s 106.
OT Africa Line Ltd v Magic Sportswear Corp, 2006 FCA 284, [2007] 2 FCR 733.
Although the Choice of Court Convention deems jurisdiction agreements to be exclusive unless
the parties have expressly provided otherwise.
75. See Appendix, below, s 8(3).
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to protect weaker parties. In addition to the limits on the scope of the Choice of
Court Convention noted above, article 2(1) of the Convention provides that:
This Convention shall not apply to exclusive choice of court agreements a) to which a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household
purposes (a consumer) is a party;
b) relating to contracts of employment, including collective agreements.76

The Choice of Court Convention does not apply to jurisdiction agreements
involving consumers and workers. If the CJPTA came to include a negative
jurisdiction clause as recommended above and the CJPTA was not restricted in
its scope to commercial contracts, it would need to specify that the negative
jurisdiction provision did not apply to contracts involving consumers, workers,
and other vulnerable groups in order to ensure that they have access to courts in
their home jurisdictions.
Provisions protecting consumers, workers, and insured persons from
purported waiver of access to their home courts are found in CCQ articles
3149 and 3150:
3149. A Québec authority also has jurisdiction to hear an action involving a
consumer contract or a contract of employment if the consumer or worker has his
domicile or residence in Québec; the waiver of such jurisdiction by the consumer or
worker may not be set up against him.
3150. A Québec authority has jurisdiction hear an action based on a contract
of insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary of the contract is
domiciled resident in Québec, the contract is related to an insurable interest situated
in Québec or the loss took place in Québec.77

And as mentioned above, the CJPTA provides for jurisdiction in matters
concerning contractual obligations:
10(e)(iii) the contract
(A) is for the purchase of property, services or both, for use other than in
the course of the purchaser’s trade or profession, and
(B) resulted from a solicitation of business in [enacting province or
territory] by or on behalf of the seller.78

76. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 2(1).
77. CCQ, supra note 19, arts 3149-50.
78. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 10(e)(iii).
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In his symposium paper, Professor John McEvoy79 considered whether
there was a need for special provisions for consumers, workers, and other
vulnerable groups, such as those which exist in Quebec and the European Union?
He described the effect of a wide range of discrete provincial enactments that
displaced agreements purporting to waive consumers’ right to access their local
courts.80 Noting that the CJPTA contains special provision in section 10 for
consumer transactions, he suggested that the provision could be expanded to
include all consumer claims whether framed in contract or otherwise.
It might be added that such a provision could be extended to apply to
claims by workers and insured parties. A new subsection could provide that a
real and substantial connection to the forum would be presumed to exist if the
proceeding concerns:
6(f )(i) the purchase of goods, services or both, for use other than in the course of
the purchaser’s trade or profession, and resulted from a solicitation of business in
[enacting province or territory] by or on behalf of the seller;
(ii) the employment of a worker whose ordinary residence is in [enacting province
or territory];
(iii) insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary is ordinarily resident
in [enacting province or territory], the contract is related to [enacting province or
territory] or the loss occurred in [enacting province or territory].81
79. See McEvoy, supra note 7. A further issue about the application of the CJPTA to family law
matters is addressed in the paper by Martha Bailey. See Bailey, supra note 12. This issue is
discussed below in Part IV.
80. Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, SBC 2004, c 2, s 3; Fair Trading Act, RSA
2000, c F-2, s 2(1); The Consumer Protection and Business Practices Act, SS 2014, c C-30.2,
s 15(1); Consumer Protection Act, CCSM c C200, ss 96, 96.1; CPA, 2002, supra note 50,
s 7(1) (Ontario); Consumer Protection Act, RSNS 1989, c 92, s 21; Consumer Protection
and Business Practices Act, SNL 2009, c C-31.1, s 3(1); Consumer Protection Act, RSY 2002,
c 40, s 88; Consumer Protection Act, RSNWT 1988, c C-17, s 107; Consumer Protection Act,
RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c C-17, s 107.
81. See Appendix, below, s 6(f ). Professor McEvoy also describes the provisions of the more
detailed ULCC draft statute. For more information on the draft statute, see the Uniform
Law Conference of Canada, “Civil Section Minutes 2003”, Proceedings of the Eighty-Fifth
Annual Meeting (Fredericton, 10-14 August 2003) at item 10, online: <www.ulcc.ca/
en/annual-meetings/284-2003-fredericton-nb/civil-section-minutes-and-resolutions2003/102-civil-section-minutes-2003>; Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Civil Law
Section “Jurisdiction and Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce Project: Report
of the Working Group” (Fredericton, 10-14 August 2003), online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/
annual-meetings/288-2003-fredericton-nb/civil-section-documents/1789-jurisdiction-andconsumer-protection-in-electronic-commerce-report-2003>; Uniform Law Conference
of Canada, “Civil Section Minutes 2004”, Proceedings of the Eighty-Sixth Annual Meeting
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In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of forum
selection agreements in consumer contracts in the context of the CJPTA. The
case involved a claim for misuse by Facebook of a subscriber’s image.82 Since the
CJPTA does not provide for the negative jurisdiction aspect of forum selection
agreements, the Court applied the strong cause test that it had adopted many
years earlier and adapted it to the consumer context. In the instant case, the Court
held that the agreement was valid, clear and enforceable and that it applied to the
cause of action before the court, but that a number of factors cumulatively served
as strong cause to set aside the jurisdiction agreement. These factors included that
the clause was found in a consumer contract of adhesion between an individual
consumer and a large corporation and the claim was based on a statutory cause of
action protecting quasi-constitutional privacy rights. The decision was rendered
by a majority of 4 to 3 in which 6 of the 7 judges agreed nevertheless to the
application of a test developed for commercial contracts to consumer contracts,
and in which the dissenting judges would have upheld the waiver of the right to
access local courts in a consumer contract of adhesion.
E.

STANDARDS FOR GENERAL JURISDICTION OVER BUSINESSES

Turning from consent-based jurisdiction, to the second main basis of jurisdiction
(ordinary residence), section 3 of the CJPTA provides that a court has jurisdiction
against a person only if:
(d) that person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory] at the time of
the commencement of the proceeding.83

In understanding this aspect of jurisdiction, it is helpful to use the distinction
found in the US jurisprudence between general and specific jurisdiction.84
Where a court has general jurisdiction, it may decide claims against local persons
regardless of where the claims have arisen. In contrast, where a court has specific
jurisdiction, it may decide claims that have strong connections to the forum,
against all persons regardless of where they are based.
The law of general jurisdiction has evolved considerably in recent years.
Some of this evolution is reflected in the CJPTA and some of it has occurred
since the drafting of the CJPTA. One development in the law that is reflected
(Regina, August 2004) at 67, Appendix G at 183. This replicates in a specialized statute
much of the provisions of more general application found in the CJPTA.
82. See Douez v Facebook, Inc, 2017 SCC 33, 411 DLR (4th) 434.
83. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 3(d).
84. As explained in Walsh, supra note 7 at 192.
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in the CJPTA is the description of general jurisdiction as a function of ordinary
residence rather than presence.85 Historically, presence was used as the basis for
determining general jurisdiction in the common law standard. It was readily
demonstrated by service of the defendant with the notice of proceeding in the
forum. Service of process was said to resemble a symbolic arrest by which the
physical power of the local sovereign over the defendant supported the exercise of
jurisdiction by the local courts.86
The risk of unfair assertions of jurisdiction over persons who are on a brief
visit to the forum for reasons unrelated to the claim has become clearer with the
increased mobility of ordinary individuals and their routine engagement in online
transactions and communications. Some of the potential for abuse in the exercise
of jurisdiction over those temporarily present in the forum is addressed by the
likelihood that Canadian courts would exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction
over non-consenting defendants with no connection to the jurisdiction in respect
of matters that have little connection to the jurisdiction. This makes it unlikely
that there would be an opportunity for a clarification of the common law.
The civil law has never suffered from this confusion: General jurisdiction has
always been based on the domicile or the residence of the defendant. Similarly,
the CJPTA avoids this confusion by adopting “ordinary residence” as its basis for
general jurisdiction over defendants. Apart from interpretive issues, the ordinary
residence standard of the CJPTA is far clearer and more widely accepted than the
common law. Indeed, it is arguable that, for all practical purposes, the common
law standard of presence operates on the basis of the defendants’ ordinary
residence even in the provinces that have not adopted the CJPTA. Accordingly,
the adoption of the CJPTA ordinary residence standard may be sufficient to clarify
this de facto situation and bring the law in line with prevailing international
standards for claims against individuals.
However, as Catherine Walsh discusses in her article, the international
standards for general jurisdiction for legal persons (corporations, partnerships,
and unincorporated associations) have evolved since the promulgation of the
CJPTA, and in both the common law provinces and the CJPTA provinces, the
legal standard for general jurisdiction over businesses has fallen behind.87 With
regard to the law of general jurisdiction, Professor Walsh was asked to consider
“Are the standards for ordinary residence for businesses consistent with the

85. See RCP, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86. International Shoe v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945) at 316.
87. Walsh, supra note 7.
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current national and international standards?”88 In the CJPTA, the provisions
for ordinary residence are both detailed and broad in scope for corporations,
partnerships and unincorporated associations.89The provisions for corporations
include, uncontroversially, the place of incorporation and the place of central
management. However, added to these bases are: the place where a corporation
has a place of business, and the place where the corporation has an address or an
agent for service of process.90
These latter two bases are out of step with prevailing norms elsewhere. In the
European Union, under the Brussels I Regulation, general jurisdiction is based on
a person’s domicile, and a legal person is domiciled at the place where it has its:
(a) statutory seat; (b) central administration; or (c) principal place of business.91
Similarly, the 2017 draft Hague judgments convention, which uses “habitual
residence” for general jurisdiction, provides that an entity may be resident
“(a) where it has its statutory seat; (b) under whose law it was incorporated or
formed; (c) where it has its central administration; or (d) where it has its principal
place of business.”92
In Quebec, where general jurisdiction is based on domicile, a legal person
that is not incorporated in Quebec is subject to the general jurisdiction of the
Quebec courts only if it has an establishment in Quebec, and the dispute relates
to its activities in Quebec. One may question whether this restriction renders
the provision one of specific jurisdiction (i.e., one based on connections between
the matter and the forum) rather than general jurisdiction. If so, by implication,
the only basis for general jurisdiction in Quebec is that of incorporation in the
province, making the scope of general jurisdiction over legal persons in Quebec
the narrowest of all by far.
88. Walsh, supra, note 7.
89. It is unclear that there is need, in what is otherwise a generally concise and open-textured
statute, for specific provisions for partnerships and unincorporated associations. Accordingly,
the suggested drafting amendments combine them into a single provision for “legal persons.”
See Appendix, below, s 5.
90. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 7.
91. EC, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ, L12 [Brussels I Regulation]
replaced by EC, Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament of the Council of 12
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters (recast), [2012] OJ, L351/1 [Recast Brussels I] for proceedings instituted
on or after January Vol 10, 2015.
92. November 2017 Draft Convention, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special
Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, art 2, online:
<assets.hcch.net/docs/2f0e08f1-c498-4d15-9dd4-b902ec3902fc.pdf>.
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Turning to the common law, in Canada, there is considerable jurisprudence
on the “carrying on business” basis for general jurisdiction. Much of this
jurisprudence would suggest that the courts are inclined where there is such a
tenuous connection to consider whether, as is required in Quebec, the business
carried on gave rise to the claim. As this is often the case, there is scant opportunity
for clarification in the jurisprudence of the scope of general jurisdiction.
In contrast, in the United States, where “doing business” jurisdiction has,
over the years, proved controversially broad,93 in 2014 the US Supreme Court
held that general jurisdiction over corporations is confined to the place where the
corporation may be regarded as “at home.” This, in turn, is limited to the place of
incorporation and principal place of business.94
Thus, it may be suggested that the law of general jurisdiction over corporations
is currently an unfortunate ill-fitting series of standards: too broad in the CJPTA;
oddly narrow in Quebec; and frustratingly unclear in the common law provinces.
Now that the standards in the European Union, the United States, and at The
Hague Conference are converging on a clear formulation within these extremes,
it could be helpful to draw on this collective wisdom to update the standards
in the CJPTA by replacing the final two provisions for ordinary residence with
“where the corporation has its principal place of business.” These suggestions
are reflected in the Suggested Drafting Amendments found in the Appendix
of this article.95
Before turning to questions of discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction,
it is worth noting for the sake of completeness the third main basis of jurisdiction—
that of real and substantial connection. The electronic ink on this common law
standard has flowed liberally and continuously since the Morguard decision
was released more than a quarter century ago.96 The fundamental conceptual
challenges experienced with it in the common law in Canada may be contrasted
with the formulation that is found in the CJPTA, which reads as follows:
3. A court has territorial competence in a proceeding that is brought against a
person only if…

93. Hague Conference on Private International Law, “Some reflections on the present state
of negotiations on the judgments protect in the context of the future work programme
of the conference,” Prel Doc No 16 in Proceedings of the Nineteenth Session (The Hague,
February 2002), online: <assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd16e.pdf> [Negotiations on the
Judgments Project].
94. Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S Ct 746 at 760-63 (2014).
95. See Appendix, below, s 5(b).
96. Morguard, supra note 15.
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(e) there is a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or territory]
and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based. …
10. Without limiting the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that
constitute a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or territory]
and the facts on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial connection
between [enacting province or territory] and those facts is presumed to exist if the
proceeding … .97

Although no symposium paper author was tasked specifically with revisiting
the debates about whether this formulation appropriately describes the scope
of this basis of jurisdiction, or whether the individual grounds referred to as
presumptive real and substantial connections met this standard, various issues
relating to this ground of jurisdiction have been taken up in the course of
addressing other topics.

III. DISCRETION IN ACCEPTING AND DECLINING
JURISDICTION
A. RESIDUAL JURISDICTION: “PERSONAL OR JURIDICAL ADVANTAGE” BY
ANOTHER NAME?

Moving beyond the main bases of jurisdiction, there is a secondary form of
positive jurisdiction that is worth considering: that of residual jurisdiction.
Residual jurisdiction, or “forum of necessity jurisdiction”98 is an extended or
enlarged form of jurisdiction exercised on a discretionary basis in extraordinary
circumstances to promote access to justice or to prevent a denial of justice.
The concept of residual jurisdiction seems new to common law lawyers, but
perhaps only because they have been used to seeing it in another form. At one
time, the approach in the common law to assumed jurisdiction made residual
jurisdiction unnecessary. The threshold for jurisdiction simpliciter in cases of service
ex juris was very low, and excesses were controlled by a robust application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. In exercising its discretion upon an application
for a stay, the court considered whether granting a stay would unjustly deprive
a plaintiff of a legitimate juridical or personal advantage. If so, the court would
deny the stay even though it had concluded that it was a forum non conveniens.
Accordingly, under this former approach, the opportunity to persuade a court
to deny a stay served a similar function to residual jurisdiction. Its placement
97. CJPTA, supra note 1, ss 3(e), 10.
98. Janet Walker, “Muscutt Misplaced: The Future of Forum of Necessity Jurisdiction in Canada”
(2009) 48:1 Can Bus LJ 135.
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at the end of a series of several steps in the jurisdictional analysis (i.e., after the
court had considered and decided that it had jurisdiction simpliciter, and after
the court considered and decided that there was a clearly more appropriate forum
elsewhere) ensured that it would be exercised only in truly exceptional situations
and after careful consideration.
However, following the perceived requirements of Morguard, as the courts
began to restrict jurisdiction to cases in which there was a stronger connection
between the province and the facts on which the proceeding against that party
was based, the need for residual jurisdiction emerged. For example, in Ontario
the rules for service outside the province contain an extensive list of grounds on
which service may be effected without leave of the court. However, in addition
to this, the rules contain a rarely used provision permitting service with leave
of the court in any case not provided for in the list.99 Moreover, as the Court of
Appeal for Ontario reasoned in Van Breda (CA), there might be good reason now
to recognize that although certain grounds were not presumptive of a real and
substantial connection, this did not mean that the courts ought never to consider
exercising jurisdiction on those grounds.100
Residual jurisdiction is provided for in section 6 of the CJPTA as follows:
A court that under section 3 lacks territorial competence in a proceeding may hear
the proceeding despite that section if it considers that
(a) there is no court outside [enacting province or territory] in which the plaintiff
can commence the proceeding, or
(b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside [enacting province or
territory] cannot reasonably be required.101

B. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF RESIDUAL JURISDICTION AND
STANDARDS FOR ITS USE

In the civil law, where jurisdiction is exercised on the basis of more strictly defined
grounds with no forum non conveniens corrective, the need for a discretion to
extend jurisdiction in extraordinary circumstances has been met with provisions
such as that found in the Swiss Private International Law for forum of necessity.102
Whether this is intended to serve as a means of correcting anomalous deficiencies
99.
100.
101.
102.

RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02.
Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 80.
CJPTA, supra note 1, s 6.
Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL) 1 of December
18, 1987, art 3.
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in the regular grounds for exercising jurisdiction or whether it is intended to
address truly extraordinary circumstances is unclear. Perhaps it is both.
A provision for forum of necessity was also included in the CCQ. In Quebec,
article 3136 provides:
Even though a Quebec authority has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may
nevertheless hear it provided the dispute has a sufficient connection with Quebec,
if proceedings abroad prove impossible or the institution of proceedings abroad
cannot reasonably be required.103

As mentioned earlier, in its review of the real and substantial connection
standard in Van Breda, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized in principle
the need to include this form of jurisdiction among the common law bases of
jurisdiction. This followed, in part, from the elimination of grounds such as
“damage sustained in the province” and “necessary or proper parties” that were
once used in exceptional situations to permit access to the courts.104
Michael Sobkin’s symposium paper addressed the questions: “Is there a need
for residual jurisdiction to promote access to justice for plaintiffs who cannot sue
elsewhere and to enable other parties to be joined as necessary? What is the proper
standard?”105 In it, Mr. Sobkin considered in detail the existing jurisprudence and
commentary. He discussed an emerging line of cases relating to matters such as
those involving allegations of torture by foreign state officials that the courts have
recognized as ideally suited for this kind of jurisdiction.106
In many such cases, it would seem unlikely for the court exercising such
jurisdiction to be in a position to produce an internationally enforceable judgment.
This would once have been the case with all judgments based on service ex juris
and, in this way, might have been more easily accepted. However, under the
approach recommended in Morguard (i.e., that courts exercise jurisdiction only in
situations in which the resulting judgment should be enforceable internationally),
the concern about enforceability might now be reason to question the purpose
of exercising such extraordinary jurisdiction. One case discussed by Mr. Sobkin
is instructive. In Bouzari v Bahremani,107 the plaintiff was the victim of torture in
Iran and one of the defendants was a relative of a former president. For obvious
reasons of personal safety, the plaintiff could not reasonably have been required
to sue in Iran. And for equally obvious reasons, it would not be expected that the
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136.
Van Breda (CA), supra note 23 at para 72.
See Sobkin, supra note 9.
Bouzari v Bahremani, 2013 ONSC 6337, 235 ACWS (3d) 936.
Ibid.
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judgment would be enforceable there. However, the acceptance of jurisdiction
and the issuance of a judgment in default ultimately persuaded the defendant
to participate in the proceedings, thereby suggesting that exercising jurisdiction
served a useful purpose.108 In this way, the likelihood of the judgment being
enforced in the defendant’s home jurisdiction was not a relevant factor to consider.
Cases such as this are truly extraordinary, and it is to be expected that the
jurisdictional analysis would entail careful consideration of the range of concerns
affecting the parties to ensure that jurisdiction is exercised in a properly restrained
manner. However, as Mr. Sobkin pointed out, residual jurisdiction might also
be used on a discretionary basis in other appropriate circumstances in cases
in which the grounds that would once have supported jurisdiction have been
eliminated because the events giving rise to the claim occurred outside the forum.
In particular, Mr. Sobkin reasoned that extraordinary cases such as the Bouzari
case may be understood as contemplated by the first phrase in the provision for
residual jurisdiction, i.e., “there is no court outside [the province] in which the
plaintiff can commence the proceeding.” Other cases might be understood as
contemplated by the second phrase, i.e., “the commencement of the proceeding in
a court outside [enacting province or territory] cannot reasonably be required.”109
Cases of this second sort could include “damages sustained in the province” and
“necessary or proper parties.” As the Supreme Court of Canada has observed,
even if some bases for service outside the province accord with the real and
substantial connection standard, “they [may] represent an expression of wisdom
and experience drawn from the life of the law.”110
As was discussed in connection with the Muscutt decision, the cases in which
jurisdiction would at one time have been based on “damages sustained in the
province” tended to be personal injury cases in which plaintiffs had returned
home from the place of injury or settled in a place to convalesce and were not
physically or financially able to litigate elsewhere. These cases involved injuries

108. The defendant appealed the noting in default to the Court of Appeal for Ontario and
brought a motion based on forum non conveniens, which was successful. See Bouzari v
Bahremani, 2015 ONCA 275, 126 OR (3d) 223.
109. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 6(b). See also CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136.
110. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24 at para 83.
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suffered in traffic accidents in other provinces,111 or in negligent medical
treatment in other provinces,112 or injuries sustained while on vacation abroad.113
Considerable attention was given to these kinds of cases in the Muscutt and Van
Breda decisions.
The second kind of case considered in some detail by Mr. Sobkin involved
“necessary or proper parties.” The need to extend jurisdiction to parties related
to claims properly before the courts arises in situations where the effective
adjudication of the case would otherwise require more than one forum to exercise
jurisdiction. Where jurisdiction lies severally in separate fora, there may be no one
court capable of properly adjudicating the claim. For example, where a defendant
wishes to claim over against a third party who is not otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, the procedural fairness justifications for third-party
proceedings within the forum serve equally to justify the exercise of jurisdiction

111. Bunyan v Enns, 2010 ONSC 216, 99 OR (3d) 304 (liability witnesses in Alberta where
highway accident occurred, damages evidence in forum, held that plaintiff’s recovery might
be jeopardized if forced to travel to sue, stay denied); Kahlon v Cheecham, 2010 ONSC 1957,
187 ACWS (3d) 700 (accident in British Columbia, plaintiff could not show residency in the
forum at the time of the accident); Dennis v Farrell, 2010 ONSC 2401, 84 CCLI (4th) 64
(liability admitted for car accident in British Columbia and damages evidence located in the
forum; inconvenient for injured plaintiff to travel to sue); Lintner (Litigation Guardian Of ) v
Saunders, 2010 ONSC 4862, 192 ACWS (3d) 1155 (accident in British Columbia, plaintiff
could not show residency in the forum at the time of the accident); Cardinali v Strait, 2010
ONSC 2503, 188 ACWS (3d) 1017 (parties insured in Ontario and Michigan, respectively,
but by same insurer).
112. Dennis v Salvation Army Grace General Hospital Board, 1997 NSCA 177, 156 NSR (2d)
372; Oakley v Barry, 1998 NSCA 68, 166 NSR (2d) 282; O’Brien v Canada (Attorney
General), 2002 NSCA 21, 201 NSR (2d) 338; Bouch, supra note 34; Fewer, supra note 32;
Dembroski v Rhainds, 2011 BCCA 185, 333 DLR (4th) 437; Ayles v Arsenault, 2011 ABQB
493, 523 AR 233.
113. Sinclair v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc (2002), 60 OR (3d) 76, 213 DLR (4th)
643 (CA) (members of restaurant chain located in Buffalo not required to defend slip and
fall action in Toronto). But see Mynerich v Hampton Inns Inc, 166 ACWS (3d) 61, 2008
CarswellOnt 1855 (WL Can) (Sup Ct) (Quebec hotel required to defend slip and fall action
in Ontario as a result of evidence of insurance coverage); Dilkas v Red Seal Tours Inc, 2010
ONCA 634, 104 OR (3d) 221 (where defendants’ post-accident indemnity agreement
contemplated litigation in the forum and primary issue was quantification of damages,
evidence of which was in the forum); Moore v Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, 2011 ONSC
3692, 204 ACWS (3d) 278 (the port could not be expected to defend every tourist’s claim in
the tourist’s home jurisdiction).
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over third parties elsewhere.114 In situations where a claimant may not have
access to the defendant who bears ultimate responsibility or may not have an
obligation to seek recovery from anyone other than an intermediate defendant,
it could be unfair for a plaintiff to lack access to the ultimate defendant or for the
intermediate defendant to bear the responsibility for an enforceable judgment
pending an action to claim over the loss from the ultimate defendant.115 This may
seem particularly unfair in cases where the ultimate defendant is an insurer.116
Similarly, where a person suffers separate injuries in two or more fora causing
indivisible harm, separate adjudications risk producing irreconcilable judgments.
It may be difficult or impossible for either court to assess the respective proportions
of harm caused by the defendants when the court has only one of the defendants
before it. The finger pointing between the defendant who is present in each forum

114. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(q). It is stated that:
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario with an
originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against the party consists of
a claim or claims … (q) properly the subject matter of a counterclaim, crossclaim or third or
subsequent party claim under these rules.

For an excellent analysis of this basis of jurisdiction, see Koji Takahashi, Claims for
Contribution and Reimbursement in an International Context: Conflict-of-laws Dimensions of
Third Party Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
115. Red Sea Insurance Co Ltd v Bouygues SA (1994), [1995] 1 AC 190, [1994] 3 WLR 926
(PC) (interpreting governing law to permit claim over in the same proceeding); Josephson
(Litigation Guardian of ) v Balfour Recreation Commission, 2010 BCSC 603, 10 BCLR (5th)
369. This is to be distinguished from cases in which the defendant and the third party have
entered into an exclusive jurisdiction agreement nominating another court (e.g., GreCon
Dimter Inc v JR Normand Inc, 2005 SCC 46, [2005] 2 SCR 401) or there is strong reason
for the claim against the third party to be decided elsewhere (e.g., Teck Cominco Metals Ltd v
Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11, [2009] 1 SCR 321 [Teck Cominco]).
116. Misyura v Walton, 2012 ONSC 5397, 112 OR (3d) 462; Paraie v Cangemi, 2012 ONSC
6341, 113 OR (3d) 231; Mitchell v Jeckovich, 2013 ONSC 7494, 235 ACWS (3d) 671;
Tamminga v Tamminga, 2014 ONCA 478, 120 OR (3d) 671; Forsythe v Westfall, 2015
ONCA 810, 128 OR (3d) 124 (plaintiff passenger who was injured in a single car collision
was required to sue own insurer in Ontario and was not permitted to join the defendant who
was resident elsewhere).
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and the defendant in the other forum is bound to generate inconsistencies in
respective adjudications and to result in an incomplete recovery for the plaintiff.117
Jurisdiction over related cases is available in the European Union118 and
continues to be available in many common law jurisdictions, such as the English
courts.119 It used to be available in Canadian courts,120 where the grounds for
service outside the jurisdiction were once fashioned with a view to producing
judgments that had only local effect. In Canada, in reviewing the rules for service
117. McNichol Estate v Woldnik (2001), 150 OAC 68, 13 CPC (5th) 61 (CA) (jurisdiction over
one out-of-province co-defendant among several local defendants in medical malpractice
claim); Sekela v Cordos, 2015 BCSC 732, 77 BCLR (5th) 184 (jurisdiction over foreign
defendant declined where plaintiff injured in car accident in foreign forum and a second
accident in the forum the next day giving rise to indivisible injuries); Mannarino v Brown
Estate, 2015 ONSC 3167, 50 CCLI (5th) 122 (plaintiff injured in accident in the forum
and, six weeks later, in accident in another forum; court declined jurisdiction over defendant
in second accident finding it extremely troubling that the limitation period had now passed
in foreign jurisdiction); Cesario v Gondek, 2012 ONSC 4563, 113 OR (3d) 466. But see Best
v Palacios, 2016 NBCA 59, 410 DLR (4th) 367 [Best] (jurisdiction based on second accident
in the forum exacerbating original injury declined).
118. Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 8. Article 8 states:
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued:
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of
them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings;
(2) as a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee or in any other third-party
proceedings, in the court seised of the original proceedings, unless these were instituted
solely with the object of removing him from the jurisdiction of the court which would be
competent in his case.

119. The Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132. Practice Direction 6(b), s 3.1(3)
states the following:
A claim is made against a person (“the defendant”) on whom the claim form has been or
will be served (otherwise than in reliance on this paragraph) and – (a) there is between the
claimant and the defendant a real issue which it is reasonable for the court to try; and (b)
the claimant wishes to serve the claim form on another person who is a necessary or proper
party to that claim.

120. RCP, supra note 22, r 17.02(o). Rule 17.02(o) was revoked in 2014 by O Reg 43/14,
s 6. It stated:
A party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario with an
originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against the party consists of a
claim or claims … (o) against a person outside Ontario who is a necessary or proper party to a
proceeding properly brought against another person served in Ontario.
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out to ensure that they complied with the requirement that they represent a “real
and substantial connection,” these grounds were eliminated in places such as
Ontario.121 In provinces where they were not eliminated, they were read down to
conform to meet that standard.122
These situations raise challenging issues of procedural fairness in that they
involve an exercise of jurisdiction over defendants who would otherwise not
expect to have to defend themselves in that forum. It is important, therefore,
that jurisdiction be exercised on a discretionary case-by-case basis to ensure, for
example, that the forum selected is a suitable one. Courts faced with challenges
involving parallel proceedings in these situations might also consider ways of
coordinating the proceedings, for example, by staying the final determination
of the matter before them until the proceeding in the other forum has been
heard and, perhaps, the findings in the local proceeding have been taken into
account.123 In an era in which courts feel constrained to exercise jurisdiction
only where it will produce a judgment enforceable elsewhere, this kind of
jurisdiction may seem problematic, but the law may need to move beyond that
perceived restriction.124
The important point is that in situations where it would otherwise be
warranted, the absence of jurisdiction over related claims and necessary parties is
bound to be productive of injustice. As Mr. Sobkin concluded, there appears to
be provision for this kind of jurisdiction in the CJPTA, and it remains only for
the courts to re-establish the timeworn practice in the common law of exercising
positive jurisdiction on a discretionary basis. Possible amendments to the CJPTA
that would indicate the availability of residual jurisdiction in these situations
together with the requirement that it be exercised in a properly restrained manner
are indicated in the Appendix of this article.
C. DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION: THE COMMON LAW
LANGUISHES

One of the great common law contributions to the law of jurisdiction of the last
century was the doctrine of forum non conveniens, under which a court having
jurisdiction to decide a case could exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction
121. Ibid; CJPTA (BC), supra note 2 (this Act, along with its counterparts in Saskatchewan and
Nova Scotia, contain no provision comparable to the previous Rule 17.02(o) of the RCP).
122. Best, supra note 117.
123. Safeway Holdings (Alberta) Ltd v Cactus Ridge Estates Inc, 2016 ABQB 411, 268 ACWS (3d)
764; Safeway Holdings (Alberta) Ltd v Cactus Ridge Estates Inc, 2014 BCSC 2237, 247 ACWS
(3d) 690 (claim against guarantors brought in two provinces).
124. As is discussed in Part V, below.
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where there was a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. Unlike courts in
the civil law, where judges have principal carriage of the matters assigned to them
and a responsibility to see them through to their final disposition, common law
courts have a less proactive role, which can make their process more vulnerable to
abuse. The parties plan much of the litigation in advance of presenting it to the
court, and, as part of this planning, plaintiffs may select a forum strategically on
the basis that it will provide an advantage that they would not reasonably expect
in the natural forum. This opportunism has been described as “forum shopping”
and it has made common law courts wary of being co-opted in an unfair process.
Although this is an inevitable by-product of party prosecution, the issue came
to the fore only within the last fifty years as the mobility of litigants increased.
England was one of the fora most likely to be affected because the Commercial
Court in London had long been a leading forum for international litigation.125
When the need to exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction became clear, and the
test crystallized in the jurisprudence of the House of Lords, the relevant factors
for consideration were left open-ended. This was not necessarily a flaw in the test,
as it was meant to reflect a court’s inherent powers to prevent abuse and to have
a cautionary effect on clever lawyering.
As with other areas of the law, it might have been hoped that the doctrine
would mature and the basis for exercising discretion might have become clearer
and more structured. Some progress was made in this direction. The House of
Lords came to recognize that the discretion needed to be applied differently in
cases involving exclusive jurisdiction agreements from those in which more than
one forum was suitable.126 In cases involving exclusive jurisdiction agreements,
the court’s role in reviewing them should be limited to determining whether
the agreement is invalid or contrary to public policy. This takes the question
of jurisdiction out of the realm of discretion. A further question that arose in
the early Canadian jurisprudence was whether the burden of proof should vary
125. As a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction, the United States was also affected. However, in the
United States, where the right to jury trials occupies considerable public resources, the
concerns are different from elsewhere in the common law and they have given rise to a review
of different factors, making the jurisprudence there less relevant. See Piper Aircraft Co v
Reyno, 454 US 235 (1981).
126. The House of Lords also identified a third kind of case: That in which a claim had been
brought inappropriately in a forum that provided a unique remedy, which the claimant
would not reasonably expect to receive in an appropriate forum. However, the issue arises in
that kind of case only where it is the jurisdiction of a foreign court that is being challenged in
an application for an anti-suit injunction and so is beyond the scope of this symposium. See
Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel (1998), [1998] UKHL 12, [1999] 1 AC 119.
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between local defendants and those based elsewhere. At the time, the debate was
influenced by the now superseded view that rules of service determined the scope
of jurisdiction.127 Since then, the debate has continued in the jurisprudence.128
As Professor Elizabeth Edinger noted in her symposium paper, beyond these
two points (the distinction between cases involving jurisdiction agreements and
those involving another potentially more suitable forum, and the distinction
between cases involving local and foreign defendants) there has been little progress
made in refining the bases on which discretion is exercised and the manner in
which it is exercised. This is the case with both the CJPTA and the common
law. The English courts have become preoccupied with the European rules that
they were now required to apply—rules that are heavily influenced by the civil
law and that all but eliminate the use of discretion. And, as discussed at the
outset of this paper, Canadian courts themselves became preoccupied with issues
of jurisdiction simpliciter with the Muscutt and Van Breda tests which prevailed
from 2002–2012 and which incorporated discretionary features that left little
room for forum non conveniens analysis. As a result, over the last two decades, the
common law of forum non conveniens has languished.
D. STRUCTURING THE DISCRETION TO DECLINE JURISDICTION

The structure of discretion to decline jurisdiction in cases involving jurisdiction
agreements could be improved. In cases involving agreements exclusively
nominating the forum in which the matter has been commenced, the court
should have discretion to decline jurisdiction only where the agreement has been
determined to be invalid or contrary to public policy. And in cases involving
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, the court should base its exercise of
discretion to accept or to decline jurisdiction on a presumption in favour of
the forum selected by the parties. Provisions to this effect are contained in the
suggested drafting amendments in the Appendix of this article.
Similar considerations regarding the burden of proof could be introduced for
jurisdiction based on the ordinary residence of the defendant and on a real and
substantial connection between the matter and the forum. Despite the continuing
uncertainty in the jurisprudence on this point, the better view seems to be that
it is reasonable for a plaintiff to expect to be able to commence an action against
a defendant in the defendant’s court, and it is for the defendant to persuade
127. Amchem Products Incorporated v British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1993]
1 SCR 897, 77 BCLR (2d) 62; Frymer v Brettschneider (1994), 19 OR (3d) 60, 115 DLR
(4th) 744 (CA).
128. Van Breda (SCC), supra note 24 at para 103.
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the court that there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. In contrast,
in cases involving defendants based outside the forum who have not consented to
the forum selected by the plaintiff, it is not reasonable for a court to presume that
it is an appropriate forum, and where the defendant objects, it is for the plaintiff
to persuade the court that it is clearly more appropriate than the defendant’s
own forum. On one view, jurisdiction based only on connections between the
matter and the forum is a kind of forum conveniens (i.e., the corollary to forum
non conveniens), and not to be presumed in the event of an objection. Possible
amendments to the CJPTA that would provide for these various presumptions
are indicated in the Appendix of this article.
A number of further points have emerged in the jurisprudence that could
be codified. First, some of the disadvantages that could await a plaintiff required
to seek relief in another forum might be mitigated by imposing terms on the
applicant for the stay. For example, where a defendant seeks a stay in favour
of a forum in which the defendant might raise a time bar, the defendant could
be required as a term of granting the stay to undertake to refrain from making
such a defence. Should a defendant who has been granted a stay fail to comply
with the terms, the stay may be lifted and the action resumed.129 The fact that
stays may be granted on terms is well understood in some common law systems
and less well understood in others. A revised CJPTA might include specific
mention of the possibility of imposing terms on the granting of a stay. Second,
the settled view has been that the standard on which a stay is granted is that the
proposed forum is clearly more appropriate. A revised CJPTA might include this
qualification as well.
Third, turning to the factors themselves, five points might be mentioned.
First, while the defendant’s participation in the proceedings is less definitive in
precluding a request for a stay based on forum non conveniens than it is in precluding
an objection to jurisdiction simpliciter, the nature and extent of such participation
may be a relevant factor in determining whether the applicant should be regarded
as having waived the right to seek a stay. Second, perhaps the most significant
consideration will be the comparative convenience and expense for the parties.
This will include factors such as their respective abilities to present witnesses and
relevant documents, their relative abilities to litigate outside their home fora, and
a myriad of other logistical considerations that are difficult to catalogue. Third,
there may be a separate question that arises in relation to the accessibility of
129. This is what happened in the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal with the case Quadrangle
Holdings. In that case, the limitation period in the proposed forum was mandatory. See
Quadrangle Holdings Ltd v Coady, 2015 NSCA 13, 355 NSR (2d) 324.
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relevant evidence. Fourth, in a common law system where foreign law must be
pleaded and proved, the attendant expense for the parties and complexity for the
court may militate against the exercise of jurisdiction and encourage a court to
defer to a forum that would apply its own law to the case. Finally, the desirability
of avoiding a multiplicity of legal proceedings and the possibility of inconsistent
results is presented in the disjunctive in the current version of the CJPTA and
could be expressed in the more familiar conjunctive form.
Additional points that might be observed about the current version of the
CJPTA are that it includes “the enforcement of an eventual judgment,”130 a point
that could be speculative at the commencement of the matter, and the relevance
of which has been questioned.131 Further, the generic “fair and efficient working
of the Canadian legal system as a whole”132 could be subsumed in wording
in the introductory paragraph that made the exercise of jurisdiction and the
consideration of the relevant factors permissive. Suggested drafting amendments
based on these various considerations have been included in the Appendix
of this article.

IV. FURTHER POINTS: TRANSFERRING PROCEEDINGS,
FAMILY LAW MATTERS, ENFORCEMENT
A. TRANSFERRING PROCEEDINGS TO OTHER FORA

One of the more concerning legal fictions that has persisted in the common law
is that in exercising discretion to decline jurisdiction in favour of a clearly more
appropriate forum elsewhere, there is some assurance that the proceeding will,
in fact, continue in the more appropriate forum. To be sure, a court may decline
to grant a stay where it is persuaded that this would unjustly deprive the plaintiff
of logistical or procedural benefits necessary to pursue the claim. And courts may
impose terms on the granting of the order so as to prevent applicants from taking
advantage of a stay to frustrate the proceedings in the proposed forum. Further,
some actions involving forum shopping may be based on claims that are not
viable in the natural forum. Despite this, there are a range of personal, practical,
and juridical reasons why the granting of a stay may have the effect of bringing a
meritorious proceeding to an end.

130. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 11(e).
131. Chevron, supra note 43 at paras 94-95.
132. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 11(f ).
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This does not happen in changes of venue within the forum, nor does it
happen within the Federal Court system in the United States133 or between states
in Australia.134 In those places, the file itself is transferred and there is no need to
commence the proceeding a second time in the new forum. Accordingly, while,
as Vaughan Black notes in his article,135 a regime for transferring proceedings
is different in kind from that for determining jurisdiction, it could well be
understood as a useful adjunct within Canada to facilitate the process of ensuring
that proceedings are decided in appropriate fora.
As a new feature of jurisdictional law in Canada, introduced only with
the coming into force of the CJPTA, it seemed suitable in the symposium to
assess the progress that had been made. In his symposium paper, Professor Black
observed that the dearth of jurisprudence on the subject suggests that it remains
a largely uncharted area of the law. In the case law, as it exists, there does not
appear to be any clear indication that the transfer mechanism has been assessed
unfavourably and is being avoided: It is simply new and largely untested. And,
as Professor Black observed, while there is no prohibition on sending proceedings
to fora that have not adopted the CJPTA, the process of sending and receiving
matters would seem likely to benefit from procedural rules that would clarify the
procedure involved. These rules, of course, have not been introduced in provinces
that have not adopted the CJPTA. As Professor Black noted, they also have
not been introduced in any detail in provinces that have adopted the CJPTA.
He points out that detailed rules to facilitate transfers of proceedings in child
custody matters have been adopted in England’s Family Procedure Rules and have
been the subject of considerable judicial interpretation.136
Accordingly, the transfer mechanism, though useful in principle, might
become more useful in practice if suitable rules of procedure were adopted to
facilitate it, as has occurred in other areas of the law. Whether reform of the
CJPTA should also seek to include either the existing or a revised version of the
provisions for transferring proceedings is a question best left to the discretion of
legislators in provinces interested in codifying the law of jurisdiction.
B. FAMILY MATTERS AND THE SCOPE OF THE CJPTA

Another unfortunate legal fiction of the common law is that jurisdictional
rules are trans-substantive, i.e., the same rules apply to all matters in personam
133.
134.
135.
136.

Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 USC §§ 1404, 1406 (1948).
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NSW), No 125.
Black, supra note 11.
The Family Procedure Rules 2010 (UK), SI 2010/2955.
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regardless of the subject matter in question. It is true that one feature of the
common law different from the civil law is the tradition of maintaining courts
of general jurisdiction, as opposed to dividing the court system into separate
departments for different types of cases, such as private law and public law.
However, the suggestion that the standards for jurisdiction in civil and
commercial matters apply equally to family law matters is simply untrue. This
is illustrated by the structure of many conflict of laws treatises. While it is
typical to have a chapter covering the topic of judicial jurisdiction in matters
in personam without qualification as regards the areas of law to which the
rules apply, it is also typical to have subsequent chapters covering areas such as
marriage, divorce, custody, and support in which the first few sections of the
chapter outline specialized rules for jurisdiction. Confusion on the difference
between the standards has been illustrated by the appropriation of jurisdictional
standards developed in divorce matters for civil and commercial matters,137 and
the application of the CJPTA to family law matters.138
The CJPTA provides no indication of its scope of application other than to
provide that it defers to other jurisdictional statutes. While this has the effect
of supporting the jurisdictional regimes that are established by statutes in the
area of family law, it has not prevented courts in CJPTA provinces from using it
for guidance where those statutes appear to be unclear or to have gaps.139 This
situation is to be contrasted with the CCQ, which contains a section of the

137. Morguard, supra note 15. The “real and substantial connection test” in Morguard was taken
from an earlier House of Lords Decision. See Indyka v Indyka (1967), [1969] 1 AC 33,
[1967] 3 WLR 510 (HL).
138. Anaka v Yeo, 2006 SKQB 201, 282 Sask R 279 [Anaka] (neither child’s presence in province,
nor nominal or procedural step taken by respondent could confer jurisdiction under the
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act where the Children’s Law Act, 1997, SS 1997
c C-8.2 [CLA] did not. See CJPTA (SK), supra note 2); Giles v Beisel, 2005 SKQB 390,
20 RFL (6th) 161 (no inconsistency existed with the CLA in the provisions for determining
the appropriate forum as the CJPTA alone contained factors for making the determination);
Hunter v Hunter, 2005 SKCA 76, [2006] 5 WWR 141 (no inconsistency with Family
Property Act, SS 1997, c F-6.3, s 54).
139. Anaka, supra note 138 (no jurisdiction to determine matrimonial property dispute under
CJPTA (SK), supra note 2, where all relevant connections were to another province); Hubrich
v Keil, 2011 BCSC 1745, 210 ACWS (3d) 476; Yonis v Garado, 2011 NSSC 110, 301
NSR (2d) 148; Inglis v Inglis, 2012 NSSC 124, 316 NSR (2d) 75 (ordinary residence in
province of applicant for variation sufficient despite not being included specifically in Court
Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act).
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Title on Jurisdiction that is specifically devoted to “extrapatrimonial and family
law matters.”140
For the symposium, Professor Martha Bailey was asked to consider, “Should
there be a consolidated set of rules for family law matters, such as exists in
Quebec for family law matters? What kinds of proceedings would it include?”
Professor Bailey noted in her paper that there are fundamental constitutional
challenges to consolidating such rules, including the fact that legislative authority
in the field is divided between the Federal and provincial legislatures. These
divisions complicate judicial jurisdiction, dividing it between superior courts and
provincial courts. Moreover, in the specialized field of family law, practitioners
are sufficiently familiar with and resigned to the byzantine structure of the law
and the court system that they regard the possibility of a consolidated set of
jurisdictional rules as a matter of curiosity. Nevertheless, given the complexity of
the matter, Professor Bailey acknowledged that a consolidated listing of the various
jurisdictional rules and where they may be found in legislation would be helpful.
Other jurisdictional regimes, such as the Brussels I Regulation and the Choice
of Court Convention, address this issue as one of the scope of their application.
These regimes provide that they apply to “civil and commercial matters” (and thus
not, for example, to family law matters) and also include provisions specifying a
140. CCQ, supra note 19, art 3141-47. The provisions read as follows:
3141. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to hear personal actions of an extra patrimonial and
family nature when one of the persons concerned is domiciled in Québec.
3142. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on the custody of a child provided he is
domiciled in Québec.
3143. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to decide cases of support or applications for review
of a foreign judgment which may be recognized in Québec respecting support when one of the
parties has his domicile or residence in Québec.
3144. A Québec authority has jurisdiction in matters relating to nullity of marriage when
one of the spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec or when the marriage was
solemnized in Québec.
3145. As regards the effects of marriage, particularly those which are binding on all spouses,
regardless of their matrimonial regime, a Québec authority has jurisdiction when one of the
spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec.
3146. A Québec authority has jurisdiction to rule on separation from bed and board when
one of the spouses has his domicile or residence in Québec at the time of the institution of
the proceedings.
3147. A Québec authority has jurisdiction matters of filiation if the child or one of his parents
is domiciled in Québec.
It has jurisdiction in matters of adoption if the child or plaintiff is domiciled in Québec.
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range of areas to which they do not apply.141 Although it may not seem necessary
to delimit the scope of the CJPTA in such detail, the CJPTA currently contains
no indication of its scope apart from providing that it gives way to other statutes
that codify jurisdiction:
If there is a conflict or inconsistency between this Part and another Act of [enacting
province or territory] or of Canada that expressly
(a) confers jurisdiction or territorial competence on a court, or
(b) denies jurisdiction or territorial competence to a court,
that other Act prevails.142
141. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62, art 2(2). The provision reads as follows:
This Convention shall not apply to the following matters –
a) the status and legal capacity of natural persons;
b) maintenance obligations;
c) other family law matters, including matrimonial property regimes and other rights or
obligations arising out of marriage or similar relationships;
d) wills and succession;
e) insolvency, composition and analogous matters;
f ) the carriage of passengers and goods;
g) marine pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average, and emergency
towage and salvage;
h) anti-trust (competition) matters;
i) liability for nuclear damage;
j) claims for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons;
k) tort or delict claims for damage to tangible property that do not arise from a
contractual relationship;
l) rights in rem in immovable property, and tenancies of immovable property;
m) the validity, nullity, or dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of decisions
of their organs;
n) the validity of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights;
o) infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights, except
where infringement proceedings are brought for breach of a contract between the parties
relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach of that contract;
p) the validity of entries in public registers.

142. CJPTA, supra note 1, s 12.
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A moderate approach to the challenge of clarifying the scope of the CJPTA
could be to specify simply that the Act applies to civil and commercial matters,
and to retain the subordination provision excerpted above.
C. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE CJPTA: ENFORCEABILITY OF CJPTA
JUDGMENTS ELSEWHERE

The Morguard approach to the law of jurisdiction has been understood to imply
an approach to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in which the
enforcing court has a reduced mandate to review the jurisdiction of the issuing
court. In the United States, under the Full Faith and Credit obligation of Article
IV.1 of the Constitution, enforcing courts must grant full faith and credit
(i.e., accept) the judgments of other courts in the United States not only as to
the merits of the dispute, but also to the courts’ determinations of their own
jurisdiction.143 This is a departure from the general approach under the common
law. In the European Union, under the Brussels I Regulation, the approach is
also different from the common law in that the obligation to enforce judgments
issued in Europe is independent of whether the issuing court complied with the
jurisdictional rules of the Regulation.
In her symposium paper, Professor Angela Swan responded to the question,
“Will the judgments of courts exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the CJPTA be
enforceable in other provinces and countries (and are either compatible with
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye)?” Noting that the companion statute to
the CJPTA, the Enforcement of Canadian Judgments Act,144 eliminates review of
the issuing court’s jurisdiction in an enforcement action, Professor Swan argued
that the Morguard decision spoke of a constitutional requirement for courts to
exercise properly restrained jurisdiction, but did not eliminate the possibility of
jurisdictional review by the enforcing court.
As will be considered next in Part IV(D), for the common law in Canada,
this is but one of the concerns raised by the approach to the law of jurisdiction
and judgments that has emerged in the generation of jurisprudence since the
Morguard decision.145

143. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 10, 12 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
§§
96-97 (1971).
144. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act,
online: <www.ulcc.ca/en/home/333-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/enforcement-of-canadianjudgments-decrees-act/4-enforcement-of-canadian-judgments-and-decrees-act>.
145. See Part V, below.
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D. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION AND THE TROUBLE WITH DOUBLE
CONVENTIONS

One of the main incentives for pursuing jurisdictional reform is the desire to
align or to coordinate local jurisdictional regimes with international standards.
This facilitates the international recognition and enforcement of judgments.146
Accordingly, any assessment of the progress to date of the CJPTA and its promise
for the future, if adopted more widely in the common law provinces of Canada,
should consider how it would operate in the larger international context.
The jurisdictional reforms brought about by the Morguard decision (i.e.,
to recognize and enforce judgments against defendants served abroad who
did not consent to jurisdiction and did not defend) were initially advanced
as standards for defendants served ex juris in other parts of Canada. However,
Canadian courts found no reason to refrain from applying this more generous
approach to the judgments of foreign courts as well, despite the fact that courts
in other countries would not enforce judgments from Canadian courts where
jurisdiction ex juris had been exercised on this basis (i.e., over non-consenting
defendants who did not participate in the proceedings). In the case of courts in
civil law countries, their jurisdictional statutes did not provide for recognition on
this basis, and in the case of common law courts, leading courts in England and
Ireland rejected it.147
Nevertheless, the view that the way forward in cross-border litigation was
to develop regimes for both jurisdiction and judgments so as to correlate them
was widely accepted. At the same time that the Canadian legal community
was beginning to explore this new approach, the Hague Conference on Private
International Law was initiating a project to develop a multilateral judgments
convention. The Hague Conference delegates considered whether they should
negotiate a simple convention that would deal only with the recognition and
enforcement of judgments; a double convention, with standards both for
jurisdiction and for judgments; or a mixed convention that included further
jurisdictional grounds that did not give rise to an obligation to enforce. Ultimately,
146. Morguard, supra note 15 at 1100. This coordination was demonstrated in the Morguard
analysis itself, in which judgments enforcement was the driver, as was the case in the United
States in which Full Faith and Credit prompted review of the law of judicial jurisdiction,
and in the European Union in which the provision requiring the member states to negotiate
a judgments enforcement regime prompted the development of a “double convention,” i.e.,
one that included a regime for jurisdiction as well.
147. In re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd, [2012] IESC 12, [2012] 1 IR 722; Rubin v Eurofinance SA,
[2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236.
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the Hague Conference delegates decided that they needed to negotiate a double
convention that regulated jurisdictional standards in the courts of countries that
adopted it and also imposed an obligation on those courts to enforce judgments
from other courts that had adopted the convention.
This approach had a clear track record in the European Union in the Brussels
1 Regulation.148 The member states of the European Union had been instructed
in the original Treaty of Rome to develop a regime for the mutual recognition of
judgments and it had seemed convenient to them to achieve this result by also
establishing harmonized rules for jurisdiction.149
As Joost Blom explained in his paper, the Hague Conference delegates
pursued this approach until it became clear in 2002 that they would be unable
to agree on the regime for jurisdiction.150 The Special Commission (of the Hague
Conference) reviewed the progress and decided to re-group and pursue, through
an informal Working Group, a much narrower convention—one that was
limited to business-to-business disputes in which the parties had complied with
a forum selection clause. That convention was completed in 2005 and was called
the Choice of Court Convention.151 It has been adopted in a number of countries
and has begun to be adopted in some Canadian provinces.
Useful though this Choice of Court Convention may be, it covers only a
small range of the kinds of cross-border cases that arise. Accordingly, the Hague
Conference has continued to pursue the possibility of a convention of broader
application through the work of an Experts’ Group. Against this background,
Professor Blom was asked to consider, “How might the CJPTA function in light
of the current Hague Conference multilateral judgments convention project and,
ultimately, one harmonizing judicial jurisdiction?”
One of the most striking features of the current work of the Hague
Conference is that the Experts’ Group abandoned the aspiration to produce a
double convention and, instead sought to draft a single convention. As Professor
Blom noted, a convention harmonizing jurisdiction may well gain momentum
in time, but that is likely to be a number of years away. In contrast, a single
convention is one in which there is an obligation to recognize and enforce
148. The European Union originally published the Brussels Convention in 1968, followed by the
Brussels I Regulation in 2001, which was revised in 2012. See 1968 Brussels Convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [1968] OJ, L 299
[Brussels Convention]; Brussels I Regulation, supra note 91; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91.
149. P Jennard, “Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters (Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)” [1968] OJ, C 59/01.
150. See Blom, supra note 13.
151. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 62.
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judgments from the courts of other member states where the courts have
exercised jurisdiction on specified bases. It does not purport to regulate direct
jurisdiction. It does not specify which jurisdictional grounds a court may or may
not rely upon in exercising jurisdiction. It merely provides that where a court
has exercised jurisdiction on one of the specified grounds, there is an obligation
to enforce the resulting judgment. Where a court has exercised jurisdiction on
another ground, another court may decide to enforce the judgment in any event,
but there is no obligation to do so.
This kind of regime is familiar to common law courts. It is the basis on which
they have operated for over a century, and it is the basis on which Canadian
common law courts operated until the Morguard decision was interpreted as
requiring them to do otherwise. Moreover, to promote wide adoption of the
convention, the Experts’ Group has established a range of jurisdictional grounds
that feature in most common law systems. As Professor Blom notes, an assessment
of the CJPTA in light of this convention could become a point of considerable
practical importance. Chief among the reasons for this is that the proposed
Hague judgments convention may come to be adopted by Canada’s trading
partners. Should this occur, it would be desirable for Canada also to adopt it and
gain the benefit of the opportunities for the recognition of Canadian judgments
that membership would bring.
To gain the benefit of membership in the convention, it would be very
helpful if there were means of demonstrating clearly which judgments issued
by Canadian courts would be eligible for enforcement. To be clear, it is the
judgment in question that is reviewed on enforcement, and not the judgments
regime as a whole. However, the prospect of conducting individual reviews of
the jurisdictional basis of each judgment sought to be enforced could become
cumbersome where no jurisdictional analysis is undertaken by the issuing court.
Where that court is in a common law province that has not adopted the CJPTA,
the basis on which the court exercises jurisdiction is not generally reviewed unless
it is challenged.
In courts of provinces that have adopted the CJPTA, it would be helpful to
clarify any grounds that may seem to depart from the eligible grounds listed in
the convention. Professor Blom conducted just such a review in his article, and
evaluated the extent to which each of the CJPTA jurisdictional bases are “Hague
compliant.”152 He also suggested that the fact that the CJPTA is not entirely
“Hague compliant” is not necessarily a reason to revise the bases of jurisdiction
152. Blom, supra note 13 at 272.

54

(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

found in the CJPTA. It is clarity as to which bases meet the standards of the
Hague convention that is most useful.
This, in many respects, is one of the features of the convention that represents
its greatest promise for success. As a single convention, it does not impose a
jurisdictional regime on the legal systems of member states. It does not contain
a “black list” of grounds that a member state’s court may not use, such as was
contained in the judgments convention proposal that failed some fifteen years
ago,153 and such as has been sought to be achieved piecemeal by Canadian courts
since Morguard. The proposed Hague convention deals only with the question of
whether, in the case of the judgment sought to be enforced, the court exercised
jurisdiction on one of the permitted bases. The effect of the currently proposed
convention on member states’ legal systems is limited to that necessary for the
required result—the increased recognition and enforcement of judgments.

V. THE CJPTA IN THE DECADE AHEAD
The change in approach at the Hague Conference has other less immediate,
but potentially more significant, implications. These relate to the intellectual
inspiration that it might provide for the law in the years ahead.
The last twenty-five years of legal analysis in the field of judicial jurisdiction
has been preoccupied with the challenges of tailoring the grounds of jurisdiction
exercised by courts in Canada to meet a standard perceived to be a well-accepted
basis for a judgment that should be granted recognition and enforcement in other
courts. This unrelenting focus on correlating the two jurisdictional standards has
created new restrictions on jurisdiction that seem to serve no other purpose.
Whether justified as constitutional imperatives or comity, these restrictions have
produced hard cases and bad law.
While many of the grounds of jurisdiction exercised by Canadian courts have
passed muster, this has been little comfort for litigants with meritorious claims
that have been dismissed due to the elimination of grounds that have regarded
inconsistent with the perceived dictates of the Supreme Court in Morguard.
Long established jurisdictional bases that were once relatively uncontroversial
came under fire. This was despite the fact that an exercise of these grounds of
jurisdiction would in any event have been subject to the discretion of the court
to decline jurisdiction where it was a forum non conveniens, and that the exercise
of jurisdiction would not have been relied upon to produce an internationally
153. Negotiations on the Judgments Project, supra note 93.
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enforceable judgment. To those committed to the goal of correlating direct
and indirect jurisdiction, exercising jurisdiction beyond a real and substantial
connection154 was inconceivable.
And yet there have been occasions when the courts have declined to be
governed by this imperative. Two notable examples are worth mention. First,
in a regime based on correlativity, there is no justification for refusing to
enforce a judgment from a court exercising jurisdiction on the basis of a real
and substantial connection other than for extraordinary reasons, such as public
policy. Parallel proceedings produce a “race to judgment.” The race to judgment
cannot be avoided in any systematic way without imposing a strict rule that the
judgment of the court first seised of the matter alone is entitled to recognition
and enforcement. The only alternative is for one of the courts to take action to
eliminate the multiplicity by granting a stay of its own proceeding or issuing an
injunction restraining the continuation of the other proceeding.
However, as was illustrated in a situation in one case that came before the
Supreme Court of Canada in 2009,155 sometimes, neither of these options are
appropriate. Proceedings had been commenced on the same day in Canada and
in the United States, and there was good reason for the proceeding commenced
in Canada to continue—and no justification for issuing an injunction to restrain
the foreign proceeding. A decision to let the parallel proceedings continue seemed
to fly in the face of the dictates of a regime inspired by the ideals of a double
convention on which Canadian jurisdictional law had implicitly been based.
Such a regime, as exists under the Brussels I Regulation, requires the elimination
of a multiplicity of proceedings and the potential for inconsistent results. And
yet the Supreme Court stood its ground and declined to impose a ruling that was
unsuitable under the circumstances.
Second, in Chevron, the SCC held that a real and substantial connection
between the matter and the forum was not required for a court to exercise
jurisdiction to decide whether a foreign judgment was enforceable in Canada.156
The Court reasoned that such an action did not involve the adjudication of the
merits of the claim or the aspiration that the results would have more than local
effect. The Court disagreed with some commentators (e.g., Pitel) who said that the
need for a separate jurisdictional basis was established by Morguard.157 Together
154.
155.
156.
157.

As proposed in Walker, “Muscutt Quintet,” supra note 29.
Teck Cominco, supra note 115.
Chevron, supra note 43.
See Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at
159-160 cited in ibid at paras 66-67.
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with “damages sustained in the province” and “necessary and proper parties”,
this reflected a third situation in which the courts’ jurisdiction over foreign
non-consenting parties was not limited to cases having a real and substantial
connection to the forum.
These two decisions, together with the leading decisions on jurisdiction in
cases of service ex juris, have highlighted both the strength and the weakness of
the common law as a means of creating a jurisdictional regime. On the one hand,
attempting to create a complete jurisdictional regime out of the obiter in discrete
cases has produced many anomalies. These anomalies have in turn given rise to
some significant jurisprudence that has been, at best, confusing and, at worst,
unhelpful. On the other hand, there have been occasions when leading courts
have been confronted with the logical implications of the emerging doctrine and,
realizing that the results would be undesirable, have refused to be governed by it.
The conclusions to be drawn from the individual papers presented at the
symposium are too many and too varied to summarize here, but some common
themes emerge. First among these is that “a statutory codification would make
the law more available and more knowable, not just to lawyers but to the
general public.”158 Second, even if the differences between the CJPTA and the
common law are not significant, their existence exacerbates the confusion and
uncertainty within this area of law. Third, while the CJPTA may need some
updating, the provisions that require attention and the attention that they require
are relatively clear. Fourth, the international community is pressing forward
with the development of new regimes for the recognition and enforcement of
judgments, regimes in which it would be beneficial for Canada to participate.
While these regimes do not appear to require significant changes to the current
law of jurisdiction in Canada, they highlight the importance of aspiring to make
our law more available and more knowable to lawyers and to the general public,
both in Canada and elsewhere.
The adoption of the CJPTA by the remaining common law provinces
might not be a complete solution to the challenges that we face with the law of
jurisdiction. However, as a regime, the CJPTA could provide a sound starting
point for the development—perhaps by the ULCC—of a revised model statute
that would serve Canadians well in the decade ahead. Some drafting suggestions
for such a revised model statute on court jurisdiction are contained in the
Appendix that follows.

158. Pitel, supra note 5 at 78.
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VI. APPENDIX: COURT JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS
TRANSFER ACT—SUGGESTED DRAFTING AMENDMENTS
PART 2: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION159
Application of this Part
2.(1) In this Part, “court” means a court of [enacting province or territory].
(2) The jurisdiction of a court in civil and commercial matters is to be determined
solely by reference to this Part.
(3) For greater certainty, except as provided in this Part, this Part does not apply to
family law matters, including divorce, custody, support, or matrimonial property.160
Proceedings in personam
3.(1) A court has jurisdiction in a proceeding that is brought against a person only if
(a) that person is the plaintiff in another proceeding in the court to which the
proceeding in question is a counterclaim,
(b) during the course of the proceeding that person submits to the court’s
jurisdiction by defending the merits of the proceeding,161
(c) there is an agreement between the plaintiff and that person to the effect that
the court has jurisdiction in the proceeding,
(d) that person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory] at the
time of the commencement of the proceeding, or
(e) there is a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or
territory] and the facts on which the proceeding against that person is based.
3.(2) However, a court of [enacting province or territory] has no jurisdiction
where the parties, by valid agreement, have chosen to submit all existing or future

159. The term “judicial jurisdiction” is the prevailing term internationally.
160. Clarifying the scope of the statute to exclude family members avoids the confusion in this
area arising from considering whether jurisdiction is conferred differently in another statute.
This approach to family law matters is consistent with the approach elsewhere in both civil
and common law. See CCQ, supra note 19; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 1; Lawrence
Collins, ed, Dicey, Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 15th ed (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2017) at ch 17-21.
161. This phrase clarifies the basis for determining “submission” or “attornment.”
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disputes between themselves relating to a specified legal relationship exclusively
to a foreign court or to an arbitrator,162 unless
(a) the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the court of [enacting province
or territory] or
(b) the jurisdiction agreement purports to serve as a waiver of the territorial
competence of the courts of [enacting province or territory] by a consumer or
worker or insured party ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory].163
[Section 4 is omitted]164
Proceedings in rem
4. A court has jurisdiction in a proceeding that is brought against a vessel if the
vessel is served or arrested in [enacting province or territory].
Ordinary residence – legal persons165
5. A legal person is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory], for the
purposes of this Part, only if
(a) it is incorporated in [enacting province or territory] or
(b) it has its principal place of business in [enacting province or territory] or
(c) its central management is exercised in [enacting province or territory.166
Real and substantial connection
6. Without limiting the right of the plaintiff to prove other circumstances that
constitute a real and substantial connection between [enacting province or
territory] and the facts on which a proceeding is based, a real and substantial
connection between [enacting province or territory] and those facts is presumed
to exist if the proceeding

162. This provision establishes a negative jurisdiction provision for exclusive jurisdiction
agreements nominating other fora such as exists in Quebec (see CCQ, supra note 19, art
3148, para 2) and the European Union (see Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 11). See also
discussion in Saumier, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
163. This provision clarifies that the negative jurisdiction provision applies only to commercial
agreements. See discussion of Saumier, supra note 7 and surrounding text.
164. Section 4 (“proceedings with no nominate defendant”) has been omitted as having never
been proven to be of use.
165. Separate provisions for partnerships and unincorporated associations are replaced by a single
provision for “legal persons.”
166. The provision for jurisdiction over legal persons having or required by law to have a
registered office or agent in the enacting province is omitted as confusing service with
judicial jurisdiction.
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(a) is brought to enforce, assert, declare or determine proprietary or possessory
rights or a security interest in immovable or movable property in [enacting
province or territory],
(b) concerns the administration of the estate of a deceased person in relation to
(i) immovable property of the deceased person in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) movable property anywhere of the deceased person if at the time of death he
or she was ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory],
(c) is brought to interpret, rectify, set aside or enforce any deed, will, contract or
other instrument in relation to
(i) immovable or movable property in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) movable property anywhere of a deceased person who at the time of death
was ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory],
(d) is brought against a trustee in relation to the carrying out of a trust in any of
the following circumstances:
(i) the trust assets include immovable or movable property in [enacting province
or territory] and the relief claimed is only as to that property;
(ii) that trustee is ordinarily resident in [enacting province or territory];
(iii) the administration of the trust is principally carried on in [enacting
province or territory];
(iv) by the express terms of a trust document, the trust is governed by the law of
[enacting province or territory],
(e) concerns contractual obligations, and
(i) the contractual obligations, to a substantial extent, were to be performed in
[enacting province or territory],
(ii) by its express terms, the contract is governed by the law of [enacting
province or territory];
(f ) concerns
(i) the purchase of goods, services or both, for use other than in the course of
the purchaser’s trade or profession, and resulted from a solicitation of business in
[enacting province or territory] by or on behalf of the seller;
(ii) the employment of a worker whose ordinary residence is in [enacting
province or territory]; or
(iii) insurance where the holder, the insured or the beneficiary is ordinarily
resident in [enacting province or territory], the contract is related to [enacting
province or territory] or the loss occurred in [enacting province or territory].167

167. The provision securing access to the courts of a consumer’s province residence is extended to
workers and insured persons. See discussion of Saumier, supra note 7 and surrounding text.
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(g) concerns restitutionary obligations that, to a substantial extent, arose in
[enacting province or territory],168
(h) concerns a tort committed in [enacting province or territory],
(i) is a claim for an injunction ordering a party to do or refrain from doing anything
(i) in [enacting province or territory], or
(ii) in relation to immovable or movable property in [enacting province or territory],
(j) is for a determination of the personal status or capacity of a person who is
ordinarily resident in [enacting province of territory],
(k) is for enforcement of a judgment of a court made in or outside [enacting
province or territory] or an arbitral award made in or outside [enacting province
or territory], or
(l) is for the recovery of taxes or other indebtedness and is brought by the Crown
[of the enacting province or territory] or by a local authority [of the enacting
province or territory].
Discretion as to the exercise of jurisdiction:
Residual jurisdiction
7.(1) A court that under section 3 lacks judicial jurisdiction in a proceeding may
in exceptional circumstances exercise discretion to169 hear the proceeding despite
that section if it considers that
(a) there is no court outside [enacting province or territory] in which the plaintiff
can commence the proceeding, or
(b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside [enacting province
or territory] cannot reasonably be required, or
(c) it is necessary to exercise jurisdiction over the claim or the party in order
to decide a closely related matter over which the court has judicial jurisdiction
pursuant to section 3(a), (b), (c) or (d).170

168. The provision for jurisdiction over “business carried on in the province” is omitted as either
redundant or exorbitant. See Walsh, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
169. This phrase clarifies the high threshold for the exercise of residual jurisdiction. See discussion
of Sobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
170. This phrase re-introduces the traditional provision for the exercise of jurisdiction over
necessary and proper parties such as continues to exist in Quebec, but clarifies that it is
subject to the same high threshold as the exercise of residual jurisdiction more generally. See
CCQ, supra note 19, art 3136 at para 2; Recast Brussels I, supra note 91, art 8; Sobkin, supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
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7.(2) In exercising residual jurisdiction under this section, the court must consider
the interests of the parties to the proceeding and the ends of justice.171
Discretion as to the exercise of jurisdiction:
Declining jurisdiction
8.(1) In proceedings in which the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is based on
section 3.(1)(c),
(a) and the jurisdiction of the courts of [the enacting province] is agreed to be
exclusive, a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction only where the agreement
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, or where giving
effect to the agreement would be manifestly unjust or contrary to public policy;
(b) and the jurisdiction of the court chosen is agreed to be non-exclusive, the
court will base its exercise of discretion to accept or to decline jurisdiction on a
presumption in favour of the forum selected by the parties.172
8.(2) In proceedings in which the exercise of territorial jurisdiction is based on
section 3(d) or on section 3(e), or on section 3(c) where the agreement does not
grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of [enacting province or territory],173
a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction on such terms as are just where there
is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere that is available and adequate,174
where it is in the interests of justice to do so, based on:
(a) the participation of the applicant in the proceedings,
(b) the comparative convenience and expense for the parties to the proceeding
and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in an alternative forum,
(b) the accessibility of evidence required in the proceeding in the courts of
[enacting province or territory] or in an alternative forum,175

171. This provision clarifies the need to consider the effect of exercising residual jurisdiction on
both parties and the broad ranging consideration of factors necessary to the appropriately
restrained exercise of residual jurisdiction. See discussion of Sobkin, supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
172. This clarifies the standard to be applied in cases in which jurisdiction is based on a
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
173. The exercise of discretion to decline jurisdiction is eliminated for cases in which jurisdiction
is exercised on the basis of a valid exclusive jurisdiction agreement.
174. The addition of this phrase clarifies the test for “more appropriate” in a manner consistent
with prevailing international standards.
175. This provision incorporates the commonly used factor relating to the accessibility of
relevant evidence.
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(d) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding or176
(e) the desirability of avoiding a multiplicity of legal proceedings and the potential
for177 conflicting decisions in different courts.
8.(3) In proceedings in which the exercise of jurisdiction is based on section 3(1)
(e), the court shall not presume that it is the more appropriate forum.178
8.(4) The court may refuse to decline to exercise jurisdiction where this would
deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate juridical or personal benefit of proceeding in
the courts of [enacting province or territory].179
Conflicts or inconsistencies with other Acts
9. If there is a conflict or inconsistency between this Part and another Act of
[enacting province or territory] or of Canada that expressly
(a) confers jurisdiction on a court, or
(b) denies jurisdiction to a court,
that other Act prevails.180

176. This provision clarifies that the factors justifying the exercise of discretion to decline
jurisdiction are disjunctive and not conjunctive.
177. This phrase combines two typically coinciding factors.
178. This provision clarifies the standard to be applied in cases in which jurisdiction is based on a
real and substantial connection to the forum.
179. This provision codifies the prevailing standard for refusing to decline jurisdiction in favour of
a forum otherwise determined to be clearly more appropriate.
180. Part 3 concerning Transfers of Proceedings is not addressed here; see discussion of Black,
supra note 11 and accompanying text.

